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I. INTRODUCTION 
The lack of inexpensive housing in suburbia is not only the result 
of market forces but also of local practices which limit low-cost dwell-
ings or exclude them altogether. The motivation behind these restric-
tions is complex, with racial and economic motivations intertwined. 
The exclusion of low- and moderate-income housing not only assures 
open space, uncrowded schools and streets, and more favorable tax 
revenues; it also excludes low-income families. I 
If this sounds familiar, it should, because it is not a new idea. These 
comments first appeared in a United States Commission on Civil 
Rights report dated July 1974, entitled Equal Opportunity in Suburbia. 2 
Despite evidence of progress, these statements currently ring true in 
Maryland as well as many other states. Indeed, the lack of conve-
niently located "inexpensive," or as we often refer to it today, "afforda-
ble" or "workforce," housing in Maryland's suburbs, and similarly 
situated communities throughout much of the nation, has greatly af-
fected an ever-growing class of citizens, including those who work in 
these communities. 
This paper presents an overview of the problem as well as the lack 
of political will to address it. It also examines the feasibility of possible 
litigation alternatives to affect a solution. Choosing the most appro-
priate federal or state judicial forum for a broad-based legal challenge 
is a critical component of this analysis. As a result, the state constitu-
tion is suggested as a basis for asserting that local governments may 
not adopt land use regulations or policies that deny housing opportu-
nities to citizens based upon their income or economic status. 
In the federal forum, the United States Supreme Court and other 
federal courts have generally been unreceptive to suits under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses 
1. u.s. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNI"IY IN SUBURBIA 7 (1974). 
2. [d. 
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that challenge comprehensive economic or social legislation that 
"draw[s] lines."3 Moreover, there appears to be no "fundamental 
right" to housing under the United States Constitution.4 Additionally, 
crippling standing barriers are often erected.5 Even when the most 
exclusionary land use regulations are examined on their merits, defer-
ential standards of review are often applied to uphold them. 6 Often, 
plaintiff's challenging land use regulations based on economic status 
assert racial discrimination because courts require them to prove that 
the failure to provide adequate housing was motivated by a racially 
discriminatory intent, regardless of its impact upon a specific 
minority.' 
An effect test can be used to prove discrimination in suits under the 
federal Fair Housing Act (FHA).8 If the plaintiffs are, however, the 
victims of exclusionary zoning based upon their economic status, but 
do not belong to one of the protected classes enumerated in the FHA, 
they have no recourse.9 
State courts address these issues in a different manner. Some state 
courts-most notably those in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New 
Hampshire-have examined local land use regulations and housing 
patterns under the equal protection and due process requirements of 
their state constitutions or the "general welfare" provisions of their 
state planning and zoning enabling acts, and found them to be exclu-
sionary.lO Moreover, these courts have not limited their inquiries to 
the relatively narrow classes of citizens protected under the FHA and 
instead have addressed the broader issue of exclusion based upon 
lifestyle or economic class. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, for example, in its famous series 
of Mount Laurel decisions,11 relied upon substantive due process and 
equal protection provisions of the New Jersey Constitution to impose 
3. See Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,8 (1974). 
4. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); see also Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8 
(holding that there is no fundamental right at issue when a local zoning law 
prohibited a group of people from living together because they were not 
family members). 
5. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
6. See id. at 520 (Brennan, j., dissenting). 
7. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) 
(quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). 
8. Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546,1555 (5th Cir. 1996). The FHA 
states that it is unlawful to make housing unavailable based upon one's 
race, color, sex, religion, national origin, familial status or handicap. 42 
U.S.c. § 3604 (2001). 
9. SeeJames v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971). 
10. See infra Part VIII.C.2. 
11. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975) 
[hereinafter Mt. Laurell]; S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 
456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983) [hereinafter Mt. Laurel 11]; Hills Dev. Co. v. 
Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (NJ. 1986); Toll Brothers v. West Windsor Town-
ship, 803 A.2d 53 (NJ. 2002). 
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a "presumptive obligation" on each developing municipality. This 
presumptive obligation forced municipalities to regulate their land in 
such a manner as to permit residential development for a "fair share" 
of their region's affordable housing needs. 12 In addition, the New 
Jersey Constitution was interpreted as requiring local governments to 
exercise their police power to promote the "general welfare" of their 
regions, not merely to increase their tax base. 13 Further, "a develop-
ing municipality ... must, by its land use regulations, make realisti-
cally possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of 
housing for all categories of people who may desire to live there, ... 
including those of low and moderate income."14 In effect, when ac-
cess to affordable housing is at issue, the due process and equal pro-
tection requirements of the New Jersey Constitution may be more 
demanding than those of its federal counterpart.15 
The constitutions of several states-including California, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin-afford equal pro-
tection and due process rights in language that is identical or nearly 
identical to that used in the New Jersey Constitution. 16 Maryland's 
Declaration of Rights provides for equal protection and due process 
rights in terminology that is similar - although not identical, to that in 
the New Jersey ConstitutionP Further, Maryland's planning and zon-
ing enabling acts are generally similar to those in New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania and New Hampshire. 18 This paper evaluates the viability of a 
"Mount Laurel' challenge to exclusionary housing regulations in Mary-
land after comparing Maryland's constitutional, statutory and stand-
ing requirements with similar provisions in other states.19 
II. MARYlAND'S AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS 
The affordable housing crisis affecting many Maryland jurisdictions 
has worsened significantly over the past few years. A corollary of this 
12. Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724. 
13. [d. at 726. 
14. [d. at 731-32. 
15. [d. at 725; see infra Part IX.D.l. 
16. See, e.g., NJ. CONST. art. 1, '11'llI, 5 (including the pursuit and obtainment of 
"safety and happiness" as an "unalienable" right); CAL. CaNST. art. 1, §§ 1,7 
(including the pursuit and obtainment of "safety and happiness" as an 
"unalienable" right); ILL. CaNST. art. 1, §§ 1, 2 (including the "pursuit of 
happiness" as an inalienable right); MAss. CaNST. pt. 1, art. 1 (including the 
"seeking and obtaining" of "safety and happiness' as an inalienable right); 
OHla CaNST. art. 1, §!§ 1, 2, 16 (including the "seeking and obtaining" of 
"safety and happiness" as an inalienable right); PA. CaNST. art. 1, §§ 1, 26 
(including "pursuing their own happiness" as "inherent indefeasable 
rights"); WIS. CaNST. art. 1, § 1 (including the "pursuit of happiness" as an 
inherent right). 
17. See discussion infra Part IX.D.l. 
18. See infra Part VIII.C.2. 
19. See infra Part VIII. 
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crisis is the problem of sprawl, an octopus that has spread its tentacles 
throughout many suburban areas within the state and beyond.20 For 
example, eighty miles from Washington, D.C., in Liberty Township, 
Pennsylvania, a "suburb of Washington," a development of 1,100 
homes is under review. 21 If approved, the development will add about 
two thousand residents, nearly tripling the size of the township.22 In 
projecting a sale price of approximately three-hundred thousand dol-
lars compared to eight hundred thousand dollars in Rockville, Mary-
land, the developer is responding to a need for more affordable 
housing that is unavailable in Washington's closer-in suburbs.23 
Meanwhile, township residents opposed to the project are concerned 
about its compatibility with the area's idyllic character and the adverse 
economic impact it could have upon their community.24 According 
to one resident, "[t]he development is parachuting a large number of 
people into an area with very, very few facilities."25 
The Liberty Township story is not atypical. Instead, it is a stark re-
flection of an ongoing trend. Local governments in Maryland and 
throughout the country have joined the effort to "manage" growth, 
including planned growth, primarily through rewriting their zoning 
and subdivision regulations and imposing various forms of develop-
ment caps, surcharges and moratoria. 26 Their actions are specifically 
aimed at residential growth, particularly higher density single-family 
and multiple-family housing.27 
"For local governments in the throes of rapid growth, '[housing] 
density is a four-letter word. . . . The consequence is they're pushing 
the problem to their neighbor, and developers are having to go fur-
ther and further away because they can't meet the demand for hous-
ing closer in."28 
The justification for housing restrictions is often that roads and 
other public facilities-such as sewer and water facilities, schools and 
fire suppression-are not adequate to keep up with planned and 
ongoing development.29 At the same time, local governments make 
20. David Snyder, D.C. Sprawl Crosses into a New State, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2003, 
at AI; see also Peter Whoriskey, Density Limits Only Add to Sprawl, Large Lots 
Eat Up the Countryside, WASH. POST, March 9, 2003, at AI. 
21. Snyder, supra note 20, at AI. To place this problem in perspective, the 
proposed Liberty Township suburb is a two-hour commute from the Wash-





26. See infra Part N; see also The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Program Narrative, 
at http://www.inhousing.org/mpdunarr.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). 
27. These types of housing shall hereinafter be referred to as "affordable" or 
"workforce" housing. 
28. Snyder, supra note 20. 
29. See infra Part N. 
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few efforts to harness non-residential development, despite the fact 
that office, retail, or industrial uses often have at least the same, if not 
greater impacts upon roads and other public infrastructure. 
Local governments apparently assume that non-residential develop-
ment has little or no impact upon schools, however, that is not always 
the case. When a new jobholder with a family arrives in the commu-
nity, that family's children will likely be attending primary or secon-
dary schools in the region, and in some states that "linkage" has been 
recognized.30 Nevertheless, many local municipalities continually fail 
to correlate the supply of workforce housing to jobs, and often make 
little or no attempt to hide their antipathy toward workforce hous-
ing.3l Many governments openly seek to attract more employment, to 
protect or enhance their real property tax base, while eschewing any 
responsibility for providing housing and schools for the families of 
new jobholders.32 As a result, these employees must seek housing 
elsewhere, often at great distances from their jobs and are forced to 
commute to and from work over substandard or inadequate roads. 
The reality is that some local governments have succeeded in at-
tracting a disproportionate share of their region's job base, while fail-
ing to provide their own fair share of workforce housing for the 
region.33 Moreover, local governments are imposing moratoria and 
30. Some states have recognized the existence of a linkage between non-resi-
dential development-office, retail, and commercial-and the need for 
school facilities. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. Sacramento, 
941 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 1991), cm. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992) (uphold-
ing a fee on non-residential building permits to be applied to housing for 
new low-income members of the workforce who would be attracted to the 
city as a result of such new development); see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n. v. 
Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 288 (NJ. 1990) (upholding fees on commercial 
and non-exclusionary housing development to support the township's Mt. 
Laurel obligations). Boston and San Francisco impose fees on new office 
development to provide housing for low-income workers attracted to newly 
created jobs. DANIEL R. MANDELKER &JOHN M. PAYNE, PLANNING AND CON-
TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CAsES AND MATERIALS 611 (5th ed. 2001). 
31. See, e.g., John McClain & Stephen S. Fuller, Future Housing SUPf.ly and De-
mand Analysis for the Greater Washington Area (The Ctr. for Reg I Analysis, 
Sch. of Pub. Pol'y, George Mason Univ., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2002 [hereinaf-
ter GMU Analysis]. John McClain is currently a senior fellow at the Center 
for Regional Analysis, School of Public Policy, while Stephen S. Fuller, 
Ph.D, serves as the director of the center. The executive summary of this 
analysis is reprinted in the Appendix, infra, at 229-36. Assertions to the 
executive summary will reference the Appendix. 
32. See GMU Analysis, infra Appendix, at 232-36; Kathleen Johnston Jarboe, 
Stretching For a Home, DAILY RECORD (Md.), Mar. 4, 2004, at lA. But see SA. 
Miller, Loudoun is Fastest Growing, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, at B1. "Being 
number one is nothing to brag about unless you are thrilled to death about 
having to build 28 schools in the last eight years and 23 more schools over 
the course of the next six years. Id. (quoting the Chairman of Loudoun 
County, Va., Board of Supervisors). See also infra Part VII.C, D, E. 
33. See generally Part IV; GMU Analysis, infra Appendix, at 232-36. See also David 
Cho, Study Pinpoints Affordable Housing Crunch, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,2004, at 
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other constraints upon residential development,34 These practices do 
not amount to responsible planning. Furthermore, these actions may 
be harmful to the basic rights of citizens, under the United States and 
Maryland Constitutions, because they deny workers access to afforda-
ble, decent housing in reasonable proximity to their places of 
employment. 
III. THE GEORGE MASON UNIVERSI1Y ANALYSIS 
The growing disparity in local jurisdictions in Maryland between 
jobs and the supply of workforce housing will likely foster even greater 
sprawl, exacerbate current levels of unacceptable traffic congestion, 
and harm local economies. Persuasive authority for these conclusions 
can be found in the George Mason University Analysis (the "GMU 
Analysis"), a November 2002 report prepared for Building Industry 
Associations of the District of Columbia, Suburban Maryland, and 
Northern Virginia.35 The GMU Analysis is entitled "Future Housing 
Supply and Demand Analysis for the Greater Washington Area."36 
Major findings of the GMU Analysis include: 
• As suburban D.C. communities increasingly call for new plan-
ning, zoning and environmental policy actions to further re-
strict residential development, an existing deficit of housing 
will increase significantly.37 
• As of 2000, the D.C. region already had a deficit in housing of 
over 43,000 units.38 
• Although by the 1990s each new household supplied the 
workforce with only 1.4 jobs, a factor of 1.6 jobs per household 
was used by local governments in their planning projections.39 
• Even using the more optimistic 1.6 jobs per household factor, 
by 2025, the demand for new households to supply the 
workforce for the job forecast will exceed by 175,000 the num-
ber of available housing units. This is based upon the collective 
expectations of the region's local governments.40 
B1 (citing a 52 page report by the D.C. based Washington Regional Net-
work for Livable Communities stating that "in the western suburbs[, includ-
ing Fairfax and Montgomery Counties,] there are more jobs, expensive 
homes and road projects, and the eastern suburbs have cheaper housing, 
but fewer jobs and transportation projects"). 
34. See, e.g., infra Part IV.C, E; see also The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Program 
Narrative, at http://www.inhousing.org/mpdunurr.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 
2004). 
35. GMU Analysis, infra Appendix. 
36. [d. 
37. See id. 
38. [d. at 233. 
39. [d. at 232. 
40. [d. at 233. 
2004] Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland 161 
• When added to the existing deficit of over 43,000 housing units 
as of 2000, the total 2025 housing deficit will be over 218,000 
units.41 
• Thus, the adopted plans of many jurisdictions will achieve 
build-out long before 2025. This will dramatically increase the 
number of workers commuting from outer areas of the region 
into central employment areas.42 
The GMU Analysis concludes that a housing deficit of this magni-
tude could require "doubling up" in poorer neighborhoods where 
low-income members of the workforce cannot afford to rent houses 
for their own families, and could further mean: 
• "Higher housing prices, and an increasingly inadequate supply 
of housing affordable for low and moderate income 
households. "43 
• "More developments occurring further out in order to attain 
some affordability, putting increased suburban growth and cost 
pressures on now rural counties."44 
• "Longer, even more congested, and odd-hour commutes."45 
• "All of these would eventually mean a stagnant or declining 
economy and quality of life."46 
The GMU Analysis further concludes that based on the correlation 
between economic and job growth with housing prices, the median 
housing value in the D.C. region will rise to $415,000 in 2025, com-
pared to $177,000 in 2000.47 
The findings of the GMU Analysis are amply supported by events 








47. Id. See Gerrit Knaap et aI., Smart Growth, Housing Markets, and Development 
Trends in the Baltimare-Washington Carridar (Nat. Ctr. for Smart Growth Re-
search and Educ., Univ. of Md., College Park, Md.), Nov. 2003 (finding 
studies similar to the GMU Analysis); see also Ezra Fieser, Smart Growth Fail-
ing, DAILY RECORD (Md.), Nov. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 10169281 
(discussing the University of Maryland study); see generally Trif Alatzas, Re-
gion's Homebuyers Run a Trying Marathon: Many Hindered by Curbs on Growth, 
Soaring Prices, BALT. SUN, Oct. 26, 2003, at 1A (providing examples of 
homebuyers difficulties due to restrictions on development and increasing 
costs); Robert]. Samuelson, Is Housing Headed/ar a Fall?, WASH. POST, Apr. 
15, 2004, at 25A (reporting that as of 2003 the median price of homes in 
the D.C. area had risen $286,000, an increase of 57% since 2000). 
48. See Whoriskey, supra note 20; see also James Upchurch, Setting Maryland's 
Houses in Order, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2003, at B8 (discussing problems that 
affect the Maryland housing market). 1000 Friends of Maryland, a coali-
tion of business, community, historic preservation and environmental 
groups interested in curbing "sprawl" and achieving "directed growth," 
162 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
More than half of the land surrounding the nation's capi-
tal is now protected from typical suburban housing develop-
ment, according to a Washington Post review of land plans in 
14 counties in Virginia and Maryland. Restrictions in these 
'rural' areas limit homebuilders to no more than one house 
for every three acres, with several counties curtailing devel-
opment even more. 
No other U.S. region of comparable size has protected so 
much land this way, according to a survey of urban planners. 
But while the limits on rural building are supposed to be 
saving farmland, forests and meadows, a regional view of de-
velopment patterns indicates that many of these anti-sprawl 
measures have accelerated the consumption of woods and 
fields and pushed developers outward in their search for 
home sites. 
"If you restrict supply in the face of growing demand, and 
if the supply is less than demand, you are going to have 
higher housing prices," said Chris Nelson, a planning profes-
sor at Virginia Tech and co-author of a study on the subject. 
Rising prices add to sprawl by pushing affordable housing 
farther out, to places as distant from Washington as Hagers-
town, Md., Charles Town, W.Va., and York, Pa. 
One of the most frequently cited measures of suburban 
sprawl, automobile travel per capita, continues to rise. From 
1990 to 2000, the area's population grew 15 percent, while 
the number of miles traveled grew about 27 percent, accord-
ing to figures from the Texas Transportation Institute. 
Similarly, land consumption is outpacing population 
growth, studies show. In the 1990s, the developed areas in 
suburban Virginia grew nearly three times as fast as the pop-
ulation; in Maryland, they grew more than twice as fast. 49 
IV. MARYLAND'S HOUSING CRISIS IS STATEWIDE 
As indicated, the problems described in the GMU Analysis affect 
not only Washington, D.C., but also Maryland.50 Local governments 
throughout Maryland have recently implemented or are attempting to 
predicts that "[t]he million additional Marylanders expected in the next 
twenty years will consume one-half million acres of open space ... if cur-
rent sprawl trends continue." 1000 Friends of Maryland at http://www. 
friendsofmd.org/friends2.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004). 
49. Whoriskey, supra note 20. 
50. See id. 
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implement selective restrictions on residential development.51 This 
has exacerbated the deepening shortage of "buildable lots" in many 
counties. Proposed state legislation to require counties to maintain 
buildable lot inventories has not been welcomed by the Maryland As-
sociation of Counties.52 A review of what is occurring in a select num-
ber of counties follows. 
A. Anne Arundel County 
Anne Arundel County has historically restricted residential develop-
ment based upon manipulation of its school capacity policies to result 
in findings of inadequacy on a case-by-case basis. The county is also 
considering increases in impact fees and is reviewing its growth con-
trol ordinance.53 Whether non-residential development will be af-
fected remains to be seen. 
B. Baltimore County 
Baltimore County imposes a strict urban-rural demarcation line-
somewhat analogous to Portland, Oregon's "urban growth boundary" 
concept-and its agricultural zone, allows only one house per twenty 
acres.54 A May 7, 2001 report, conducted by Towson University's Re-
gional Economic Studies Institute and commissioned by the Home 
Builders Association of Maryland, found that there were less than 
5,700 available residential parcels in the county.55 At Baltimore 
County's current build-out rate of 1,800 dwelling units per year in its 
"Priority Funding Area" for public infrastructure, the county has less 
than a four-to-seven year supply of buildable lots remaining, well short 
of the number needed to support the workforce expected to fill the 
county's future planned employment base.56 
C. Carroll County 
Newly elected Carroll County Commissioners have enacted a num-
ber of moratoria, lasting from nine months to a year, aimed primarily 
51. Jamie Smith Hopkins, Suburbs in Fight to Curb Growth, BALT. SUN, May 18, 
2003, at 1A. 
52. See id. See also infra notes 55, 72, 73 and accompanying text. 
53. Hopkins, supra note 51. See also Tracey Swartz, Fee Has an Impact on Housing 
Market, BALT. SUN, Mar. 14,2004, at Ll (explaining Anne Arundel County's 
$4,361 impact fee is allotted $3,388 for schools, $862 for transportation and 
$111 for public safety). 
54. Childs Walker, Carroll Halts Much Home, Commercial Development: Developers 
Had Sought More Moderate Measures, BALT. SUN, June 6, 2003, at 1A. See 
Knaap et aI., supra note 47, at 2. 
55. RESI Research &: Consulting, A Study of Available Residentially Zoned Land in 
Baltimore County (Towson University, Towson, Md.) May 7, 2001 (this study 
was presented at the 4th Annual Maryland Conference on Growth, May 23, 
2001). 
56. See id. 
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at 1,700 proposed residential lots that had already passed earlier 
stages of review. 57 The stated purpose of one of the moratoria is to 
"prevent residential growth from overwhelming schools, roads and the 
water supply."58 A number of lawsuits have been filed challenging the 
validity of the moratoria. 59 
D. Cecil and Talbot Counties 
Cecil and Talbot Counties are considering adequate public facilities 
ordinances to restrict home building in order to address overcrowded 
schools and congested roads.60 There is little indication that non-resi-
dential development will be similarly affected. Cecil County recently 
contemplated adopting a "six-month moratorium on new subdivision 
applications," but that proposal was narrowly defeated.61 Once again, 
overcrowded schools were cited as the culprit.62 
E. Frederick County 
In Frederick County, moratoria on housing construction in both 
the county and the City of Frederick have slowed countywide home 
building to its slowest pace in twenty years.63 New home building in 
the unincorporated county and its municipalities is projected to total 
just over 1,260 units in 2003, the lowest number since 1982.64 Its im-
pact fees on housing-more than $7,000 for a detached home and 
almost $5,000 for a townhouse-are already among the highest in the 
state, and face substantial increases.65 Prior restrictions have been 
based upon inadequate water supplies, while inadequate schools are 
of current concern.66 Again, there is Vttle indication that non-resi-
dential development will be required to bear similar burdens. Mean-
while, according to a recent report in The Washington Post, Frederick is 
ranked as "the most sprawling county" in the Washington area.67 
57. Walker, supra note 54, at lAo 
58. [d. Carroll County has also placed moratoria on certain industrial develop-
ments in order to prevent industrial land from being devoted to retail uses. 
[d. 
59. [d. 
60. Hopkins, supra note 51, at lAo 
61. [d. 
62. [d. 





67. Rob Stein, Suburbia USA: Fat of the Land?: Report Links Sprawl and Weight 
Gain, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2003, at A3. According to researchers, 
"[s]uburban sprawl appears to be contributing to the nation's obesity epi-
demic" because residents in sprawling areas tend to walk less. [d. Among 
the researchers cited is Reid Ewing of the University of Maryland's National 
Center For Smart Growth. [d. 
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F. Harford County 
Harford County, citing overcrowding schools, is contemplating re-
strictions upon home building, even though, according to a May 18, 
2003 article in The Baltimore Sun, the county "built eight elementary 
schools in the [1990s] to keep up with growth."68 Only one middle 
school has been added in the last ten years to accommodate the chil-
dren who would be moving through the new elementary schools and 
yet no new high schools have been built in the past quarter-century.69 
c. Howard County 
Due to crowded schools, Howard County has imposed growth re-
strictions on over one-thousand proposed homes even while acknowl-
edging that the primary source of new students is from long-existing 
homes into which young families have moved, "replacing empty nest-
ers.,,70 No restrictions are imposed on non-residential development. 
Meanwhile, the county has zoned more than half of its land area for 
sprawl development at one dwelling per 4.25 acres, and the inventory 
of homes in the county continues to decrease.71 Indeed, the number 
of homes sold in Baltimore City and the counties surrounding it fell 
by nearly ten percent in April 2003 due in part to the decreased inven-
tory of homes.72 The number of active listings in the Baltimore re-
gion in April 2003 was just under 6,600 available homes, a decrease of 
more than fIfteen percent as compared to April 2002. 73 
H. Montgomery County 
In October 2003, Montgomery County adopted, as part of its An-
nual Growth Policy (AGP), transportation and school impact taxes of 
a minimum of $13,500 per home, the highest in the state.74 When 
combined with a potential school facilities surcharge of $12,500 per 
student in overcapacity districts, plus regulatory exactions that may be 
imposed for road improvements, the total development tax upon a 
single-family dwelling could easily exceed $25,000.75 
This is not good news for workforce families in search of affordable 
housing near the location of their work. These families, however, are 
68. See Hopkins, supra note 51, at 1A. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Whoriskey, supra note 20; Alatzas, supra note 47. 
72. Alatzas, supra note 47. 
73. Id. 
74. Md.-Nat'l Cap. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n, Council Approves Highest Impact Tax in 
State, 14 LEGIS. & REG. REp. 11 (Nov. 2003); see also Catherine Dolinski, Busi-
ness Split Over Fallout From Development Taxes, MONTGOMERY GAZETTE, Oct. 
31, 2003, available at http://www.gazette.net/200344/weekendsa_section/ 
18570~1.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
75. See AGP Will Not Cap Development, Will Require School Test (Md. Nat'l Cap. 
Bldg. Indus. Ass'n), 14 LEGIS. & REG. REp. 11 (Nov. 2003). 
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an unrepresented constituency in Montgomery County, and thus were 
not at the table when important decisions concerning their future 
were made. On the other hand, the two major constituent groups 
that most actively participated in the process-homebuilders and ex-
isting residents of the county-complained mildly but were generally 
satisfied with the outcome of the review.76 Homebuilders will not be 
able to build as many homes, but in a skyrocketing, short supply mar-
ket they will likely earn significantly higher profits. Residents opposed 
to "growth" (with a major economic stake in holding down the supply 
of housing) would have preferred that the moratoria not be lifted, but 
will nevertheless continue to enjoy exponential increases in the value 
of their homes. Meanwhile, county decisionmakers predictably la-
mented the lack of sufficient affordable housing, while doing little in 
the way of effective land use regulatory reform to increase densities or 
to promote more efficient use of land in planned growth areas. 
The county's public housing agency, the Housing Opportunities 
Commission (HOC), reacting to increases of more than $100,000 in 
the average cost of a county home during the past three years, has 
reduced its interest rates from approximately 6% to 4.5% and relaxed 
income restrictions for its clientele.77 Specifically, a family of four 
seeking HOC housing in 2002 was allowed to have a maximum in-
come of only $58,055; whereas in 2003, that number had soared to 
$97,520.78 The county has also created a Moderately Priced Dwelling 
Unit (MPDU) program under which developers are required to pro-
vide fifteen percent MPDUs in any development over thirty five 
units. 79 The MPDU program has been moderately successful, al-
though the number of MPDUs produced annually has shrunk from 






Steve Elmendorf, Montgomery's Winners and Losers, MONTGOMERY GAZETTE, 
Nov. 14,2003 (describing the fallout on citizens, developers, and workforce 
housing from the County's amendment to its Annual Growth Policy). 
Robyn Lamb, Montgomery County Home Aid Grows as Market Soars, DAILY RE-
CORD (Md.), Aug. 5, 2003, at AI. 
Id. 
Bruce Romer, Montgomery County, Maryland's Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit 
Program (Nat'l Ass'n of Co. Admin.), Dec. 2003, available at http://www. 
countyadministrators.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). Developers are sup-
posed to receive "density bonuses" to offset this obvious taking of their pri-
vate property for public use, but individual applicants for subdivision 
approval often receive no bonus. Id. Nevertheless, the MPDU requirement 
is still imposed on them. Id. 
Moderately-Priced Dwelling Units Completed Montgomery County, Md. 1976-2002 
(Mongomery County Planning Bd.), Nov. 2003, at http://www.mc-mncppc. 
org/ research/ data_library / reaLestate_developmen t/housing/hc07b.sh tm 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2004). 
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I. Prince George's County 
The Prince George's County government, with its emphasis on ex-
ecutive housing, is currently pondering limitations upon the number 
of homes that may be built in its "rural tier," which consists of "land 
east of Route 301 near Charles and Calvert counties."81 Development 
would be "no more than [one] percent of the annual number of 
houses projected to be built countywide."82 Inadequate roads, schools 
and police facilities are cited as the reasons for the limitations.83 
Moreover, the Maryland General Assembly recently enacted legisla-
tion authorizing the county to more than double its current $5,000 
surcharge on housing units.84 
J Queen Anne's County 
In 1987, Queen Anne's County adopted a comprehensive plan 
designating specific growth areas where infrastructure exists and is ad-
jacent to municipalities.85 This plan was updated and revised in 1993 
and 2002, reconfirming the specific growth areas.86 In the interim, 
the county undertook to develop Growth Sub-Area Plans for each of 
the growth areas. These Sub-Area Plans established growth policies 
and were followed by amendments to the land use regulations in or-
der to implement the growth areas.87 In 1991, the county enacted a 
development impact fee ordinance88 and, in 2001, an interim ade-
quate public facilities ordinance.89 Presently included in the county's 
proposed zoning ordinance update is an inclusionary-housing 
provision. 
Despite the fact that land use regulations allow for planned devel-
opments and multi-family housing at moderate densities within the 
81. Ovetta Wiggins, Prince George's Aims to Ease Development; Measure Targets 
Growth in Swelling Rural South, WASH. POST,July 14, 2003, at B1. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See id. The new surcharge allowed is $12,000. Id. 
85. See Policies, Implementing Strategies and Priorities, Vol. 2: 2002 Comprehesive Plan 
for Queen Anne's County, Maryland (Dep't of Planning and Zoning, Queen 
Anne's County, Md.), at 9-10, availahle at http://www.qac.org/depts/plan 
zone/cpvolume2.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
86. Id. at 13. 
87. Id. at 15, 17. 
88. CODE OF QUEEN ANNE's COUNlY, MD., § 18-304 (2004) (effective Sept. 
1991), availahle at http://gcp.esub.net/cgi-bin/ om_isapi.dll?clientID=1691 
36&infobase=qul770.nfo&softpage=Browse_Frame_Pg42 (last visited Apr. 
14,2004); Interview by Erika Schissler with Queen Anne's County Planning 
Office (Feb. 9, 2004). 
89. CODE OF QUEEN ANNE's COUNlY, MD., § 28-101 (2004) (effective March 20, 
2001) availahle at http://gcp.esub.net/cgi-bin/om_isapi.dll?clientlD=1691 
36&infobase=qul770.nfo&softpage=Browse_Frame_Pg42 (last visited Apr. 
14,2004); Interview by Erika Schissler with Queen Anne's County Planning 
Office (Feb. 17, 2004). 
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growth areas, very little development is being approved.90 Citing per-
ceived environmental impacts, a lack of sewer capacity and quality of 
life concerns, officials have refused to give final approval to any of the 
major planned developments that provide for multi-family or 
workforce housing.9] County officials have demonstrated a willing-
ness to withhold discretionary approvals unless developers eliminate 
the use of apartments in planned developments. 
V. THE SOURCE OF TRAFFIC CONGESTION IN MARYLAND: EX-
ISTING VS. NEW DEVELOPMENT 
One of the major sources of traffic congestion in Maryland is the 
state's failure to provide roads to accommodate its growing popula-
tion. According to a national engineering survey, Maryland ranks ei-
ther 47th or 48th among the states in building new roads.92 
Furthermore, Maryland spends substantially less than its neighboring 
states-New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Delaware-on road 
construction.93 
Although restrictions on new housing are being imposed through-
out Maryland, many acknowledge that new residential development 
contributes but a small fraction of the need for new roads.94 Further-
more, irrefutable evidence indicates that existing households with three 
or more vehicles have increased dramatically in the past several years, 
and are also a major source of increased congestion.95 Over twenty 
percent of households in six Maryland counties possess at least three 
automobiles.96 It is not at all unusual to see four to five vehicles 
parked around such households. Indeed, while the Washington re-
90. Interview by Erika Schissler with Queen Anne's County Planning Office 
(Feb. 17,2004). Gibson Grant Development is waiting for approval by the 
County Commissioner. Id. The application for approval was first filed in 
June 2001 and there is no indication of when approval might occur. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Tim Maloney, Headed far the Breakdown Lane, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2003. 
Anecdotal evidence supports this assertion, for example, on October 14, 
2003, Washington, D.C. radio station WTOP, in its morning "sprawl and 
crawl" traffic report, stated that Maryland ranks 47th or 48th among all 
states in building roads. 
93. David Abrams, State Lags in Highway Spending, Bus. GAZEllE, Aug. 15, 2003, 
available at http://www.gazette.net/200333/weekend/a_section/173391-
I.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004) (stating that Maryland spends $134 per 
vehicle compared to Deleware's $303 per vehicle). 
94. For example, a 1995 Report by a Citizens Advisory Committee appointed by 
the Montgomery County Council found that new development produced 
less than fourteen percent of traffic on an annual basis, while existing 
households and vehicles from other sources using county roads comprised 
the remaining eighty-six percent. See infra note 165 and accompanying 
text. 
95. Lisa Rein & Robin Shulman, The Rise of the Multi-Car Family; Homes with 3-
Plus Vehicles Not Unusual in Region, WASH. POST, July 19, 2003, at AI. 
96. See id. 
2004] Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland 169 
gion's population grew by sixteen percent from 1990 to 2000, the 
number of vehicles increased by twenty four percent to 4.7 million.97 
The D.C. region now has 861,700 more registered vehicles than li-
censed drivers, 1.2 vehicles for every driver, compared to a national 
average of 1.07 cars per driver.98 
The greatest increase in multi-vehicle households is occurring in 
outlying communities, such as Calvert, Charles and Frederick Coun-
ties.99 This is a direct consequence of the shortage of workforce hous-
ing in reasonable proximity to jobs. lOO The shortage is due in part to 
the above-described exclusionary practices of many local govern-
ments, whose zoning regulations preclude opportunities for 
workforce housing. The resulting sprawl from these exclusionary land 
use practices requires longer commutes by the workforce on the re-
gion's already congested and aging highway system. Yet, no signifi-
cant fees or impact taxes are proposed on existing development. In 
other words, existing development and existing motorists are receiv-
ing a "free ride" at the expense of new development. 
VI. MARYLAND COUNTIES LEAD THE NATION IN FARMLAND 
PRESERVATION 
Ironically, some of the Maryland counties discussed above are more 
successful in preserving farmland and other open space than in pro-
viding realistic opportunities for affordable housing for their 
workforces. There are claims that these Maryland counties are among 
the nation's leaders in preserving farmland. WI A recent report states: 
Beyond its posh Washington suburbs, about 30 percent of 
Montgomery County is agricultural land. And, according to 
a new survey, the county is the nation's best at preserving the 
farmland and other open space. With 59,451 acres of farm-
land and open space preserved, the county reclaimed top 
billing on a national ranking of land preservation programs. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at A9. The counties surveyed include Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles, 
Frederick, Howard, Montgomery, Prince George's and St. Mary's. Id. Cal-
vert, Charles and Queen Anne's Counties are among Maryland's fastest 
growing counties, with a more than three percent annual growth rate. See 
Andrew R. Green, Maryland's Fastest Growing Suburbs Get Further From Cities, 
BALT. SUN, Apr. 9, 2004, at 1A. Cecil, Harford and Carroll Counties are 
close behind with annual growth rates of more than two percent. Id. 
99. Rein & Shulman, supra note 95. 
100. See id. 
101. Robyn Lamb, Montgomery County Tops in Land Protection, DAILY RECORD 
(Md.), Aug. 6, 2003. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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Four other Maryland counties, Carroll (41,445 acres), Bal-
timore (39,435), Harford (35,438) and Frederick (25,787), 
landed in the top 12.102 
While farmland preservation is an important element of Maryland's 
"smart growth" programs, so too is affordable housing. There is a 
need for more even-handedness in the state's growth management 
programs: "The key is for Maryland to balance its approach. To com-
plement its incentives and support for rural land preservation, the 
state must provide infrastructure for-and remove regulatory barriers 
to-urban development. Only then will Marylanders enjoy smart and 
sustainable growth."103 These counties can fulfill their fair share of 
the region's affordable housing needs if they use a more balanced 
approach and put forth effort. 
VII. RESTRICTIONS ON WORKFORCE HOUSING ARE A NA-
TIONWIDE PROBLEM 
Maryland is by no means alone in adopting regulations and policies 
against workforce housing. It has become a national phenomenon, 
illustrated by the following examples. 
A. California 
In California, not enough viable land is being provided for housing 
and, consequently, there is a present shortfall of approximately 
100,000 housing units per year. 104 As in most jurisdictions, moratoria, 
growth caps, adequate public facilities ordinances, large lot zoning 
102. [d. In the early 1980s, over 88,000 acres, about one-third of Montgomery 
County's land, were reclassified to agricultural and rural open-space zon-
ing. A Transferable Development Rights (TDR) program created some 
17,000 TDRs to be sent to "receiving areas" elsewhere in the county. The 
county, however, was slow in designating receiving areas and did not do so 
until after it was sued. The receiving areas were designated on master plans 
instead of the zoning map, and after an adverse court decision, the county 
corrected the problem. The TDR program, albeit one of the most success-
ful in the country, has progressed slowly due in part to an inadequate sup-
ply of receiving areas. According to a recent survey, Montgomery County, 
although affected by sprawl, is rated as the least sprawling of the Maryland 
counties in the D.C. suburbs. Howard Libit, Study Links Community Sprawl to 
Fat, BALT. SUN, Aug. 29, 2003, at lA. 
103. John W. Frece & Gerrit Knaap, Build a Better Free State, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 
2004, at B8. 
104. Michael M. Berger, A Step Down, DAILVJOURNAL (L.A., Cal.), Nov. 7, 2003, at 
6 (noting that the state needs "250,000 new homes each year to meet its 
needs"; that the new home supply is "falling short by 100,000 or more each 
year"; that because the supply of housing lags far behind demand, "the cost 
of housing has escalated rapidly"; nine of the ten least affordable metropol-
itan areas in the country are located in California, and the Southern Cali-
fornia Association of Governments gave a housing grade of D+ to the 
counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura and 
Imperial). 
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and agricultural zoning are often the regulations of choice. There is 
also the problem, rampant in Maryland and throughout much of the 
country, of residents in existing suburban communities opposing resi-
dential densities that would make it possible to provide an adequate 
supply of affordable housing. These "NIMBYs"105 often possess enor-
mous political clout, and are motivated in no small part by their own 
financial stake in maintaining the status quo. Thus, when they oppose 
new development, including higher density development contem-
plated in approved master plans, their arguments become difficult to 
resist. As workforce housing is driven away, invariably in the name of 
advancing other ostensibly worthy planning goals, the cost of existing 
housing in close proximity to employment centers continues to rise. 
In San Mateo County, for example, there has been an ongoing ef-
fort to "save Bay Meadows"-a dilapidated horserace track. 106 The 
real purpose, according to nationally syndicated columnist Thomas 
Sowell, has nothing to do with preserving the track, but everything to 
do with "preventing anything from being built in its place, least of all 
apartments or townhouses or whatever else passes for 'high-density 
housing' in California."107 Mr. Sowell further explains that most re-
sidents of the county are homeowners rather than renters and that 
both housing prices and rents "are astronomical."108 He states that 
"ordinary homes command [very high] prices because of severe re-
strictions on building."109 The black population comprises less than 
four percent of the county's residents, and this number is falling. 110 
For many, arguments about saving wetlands or endangered species 
are "a way to keep out ordinary people from the enclaves of the 
elite."lll The lesson from this, according to Mr. Sowell is that: 
Not just in California, but across the country, those who 
want to prevent other people-and especially other kinds of 
people-from living in the community where they live have 
created all sorts of red herring arguments and restrictive laws 
to deny others the same rights they claim for themselves. 
Since the 14th Amendment requires all people to be treated 
the same, why should what one group wants be enacted into 
law to override what other people want?l12 
105. Acronym for "Not In My Backyard." This refers to any group of residents in 
opposition to certain changes in their area. See Berger, supra note 104. 
106. See Thomas Sowell, Saving Crusade with a Track Recard, TULSA WORLD, July 




1l0. See id. 
llI. Id. 
112. Id. Mr. Sowell's frustration would likely have been even greater if he had 
been a plaintiff in either the Warth or Belle Terre cases. See discussion infra 
Part VIII.B.l, 2. 
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B. Florida 
In Florida, a petition drive has been "launched ... for a Constitu-
tional Amendment that would forbid land use changes without a ref-
erendum."113 "[O]ver-development is driving all the political issues, 
from overcrowded public schools to overcrowded roads."114 Promot-
ers of the amendment are confident that they will achieve the 500,000 
signatures necessary to put it on the ballot. II5 If adopted, the amend-
ment would take the power to regulate land use away from local gov-
ernment elected officials and give it to the voters. I 16 According to the 
National Center for Public Policy Research, anti-growth referenda and 
initiatives are proliferating around the country.II7 Leading up to the 
2000 election, "many affluent suburbanites [were] flocking behind 
the [anti-growth] banner.,,1l8 
Meanwhile, Florida's heralded Local Government Comprehensive 
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act of 1985, also known 
as the "Growth Management Act" (GMA) ,119 is the subject ofa critical 
report in the Summer 2003 Journal of the American Planning Associa-
tion, indicating that the GMA has had a significant negative impact 
upon affordable housing. I20 It states in pertinent part: 
[TJ his research finds that Florida's GMA has had a statistically sig-
nificant and negative effect on housing affordability in the state. 
Reduced housing affordability can have both short- and long-term 
negative social and economic consequences for affected households 
and for society in general. . . . It very significantly decreases 
opportunities for renters wanting to transition to homeown-
ership and denies them the social and financial benefits asso-
ciated with homeownership. . . . When housing mobility is 
restricted, cost-burdened households are forced to reduce 
critical non-housing expenditures or live in substandard 
housing. 
Florida's GMA is a well-intentioned effort to better man-
age the state's urban areas and natural resources. However, 
in state and local implementation of the GMA, affordable 
113. Buddy Nevins, Lawyers: Let Voters Have a Say on Land-Use Changes; Drive Aims 
to Put Amendment on the 2004 Ballot, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), 
July 22, 2003, at B6. 
114. [d. (quoting Jim Kane, "a political pollster who has lobbied for develop-
ment projects"). 
115. See id. 
116. [d. 
117. See Joseph Perkins, Anti-Growth Furor, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 13,2003. 
118. [d. 
119. FLA. STAT. Ch. 163.3161 (2002); see alsoJerry Anthony, The Effects of Florida's 
Growth Management Act on Housing Affordability, 69 J. AM. PLANNING Assoc. 
282 (2003). 
120. See id. 
2004] Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland 173 
housing has clearly not received adequate attention. Be-
cause of this neglect not only is social inequity fostered, but 
the legitimacy of the practice of planning as a means of in-
creasing societal welfare is also called into question. 121 
The report concludes that these problems threaten the "long-term 
sustainability of Florida's growth management efforts."122 
C. Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, the state Affordable Housing Law was supposed to 
trump the state's Planning and Zoning Enabling Act. 123 An afforda-
ble housing taskforce, appointed by Governor Mitt Romney, however, 
has recently learned that the reverse is true. Nevertheless, many ef-
forts have been made in the state legislature to amend or "water 
down" the Affordable Housing Law as suburban communities con-
tinue to claim that they are being overrun with development and can-
not properly plan for growth because of the law. 124 On the other 
hand, planners and land use lawyers across the nation contend that 
without fundamental reform of the Planning and Zoning Enabling 
Act, tinkering with the Affordable Housing Law is a useless en-
deavor. 125 The state's affordable housing problems are described as 
"a largely invisible crisis," which some communities are apparently 
perfectly willing to ignore. 126 
Meanwhile, the fast-growing suburbs west of Boston are seeking al-
ternatives to workforce housing, including developments with age re-
strictions in order to avoid paying for schools. 127 One state legislator 
described this tactic as "vasectomy zoning."128 The governor, how-
ever, wants more housing to be built and, specifically, "targeted in ur-
ban areas that are already 'infrastructure rich,' meaning near transit 
or commuter rail."129 
121. See id. at 288-92 (emphasis added). The report is based on data collected 
over a fifteen year period by its author, Professor Jerry Anthony, Assistant 
Professor in the Graduate program in Urban and Regional Planning at the 
University of Iowa. See id. at 282. See also James Upchurch, Setting Mary-
land's Houses in Order, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2003, at B8 ("Until we fix our 
growth-management policies, the greatest burden for fighting sprawl will 
fall on the poorest."). 
122. See Anthony, supra note 119, at 292. 
123. See Anthony Flint, Real Estate Roulette Why the State's Red Hot Housing Market 
Could End Up Hurting the Economy, Harming the Environment, and Landing the 
Suburbs in Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2003, (Magazine), at 10. 
124. See id. 
125. Cap on Living Area Not Violation of Substantive Due Process; Dimensional Regula-
tions, 31 LAND USE L. REp. 59, 59 (2003). 
126. See Flint, supra note 123. 
127. See Laura Mansnerus, Great Haven for Families, But Don't Bring Children, NY. 
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at AI. 
128. See id. 
129. See Flint, supra note 123. 
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D. New Jersey 
New Jersey Governor James McGreevey has embarked upon a pro-
gram that threatens to severely curtail residential development 
throughout the state. 130 This is ironic because the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey, more than any other state court, has repeatedly sought to 
address the problem of exclusionary zoning policies against workforce 
and family housing over the past three decades. 131 It has done this in 
a series of decisions under the famous "Mount Laurel' rubric. 132 
While the governor seeks to limit residential development, a study 
by planning advocacy group, New Jersey Future, indicates that afforda-
ble housing is not occurring in towns where jobs are emerging.133 
More than fifty percent of shelter within reach of low-income house-
holds is concentrated in just a few communities statewide, including 
Camden, Atlantic City and Newark. 134 Conversely, other major job 
centers, such as Cherry Hill and Paramus, offer very few affordable 
housing options for low-income workers. 135 The study finds that forty-
six towns that added two thousand or more private sector jobs during 
the 1990s accounted for more than twenty percent of the state's em-
ployment market, but only eight percent of its low-cost homes. 136 Five 
of these towns had no affordable housing whatsoever, and twenty of 
them paid other towns to assume their affordable housing 
obligations. 137 
Meanwhile, sprawl zoning is present in New Jersey. Many towns 
"[iJn the development corridors in central and northwest New Jersey 
... have adopted ... lot sizes of 5 or 10 acres."138 One casualty of this 
"do-your-own-thing" approach is rural Lopatcong Township, a New 
Jersey town that faces a large school bill due to the hundreds of fami-
lies that have moved there in recent years, nearly doubling the size of 
its elementary school. 139 In response, the township passed a new ordi-
nance limiting new multi-family dwellings to two bedrooms.14o The 
Town of Ventnor, in Ocean County, is offering owners of apartment 
buildings $22,000 for each year-round apartment that is converted to 
130. McGreevey Convenes "Smart Growth" Summit (Cap. Pub. Affairs, Inc., Trenton, 
NJ.), NJ. Cap. Rep., Oct. 23, 2002, available at http://www.cpanj.com/ 
capitalreportpages/ mcgreeveywatch/ october2002/MCGREEVEY% 20CON 
VENES%20SMART%20GROWTH%20SUMMIT.htm. 
131. See Geoff Mulvihill, Low-Cost Housing Not Following Jobs in NJ, Study Says, 
THE REc. (Bergen County, NJ.),july 16, 2003, at L5. 
132. See infra Part VIII.C.2.i.a. 
133. See Mulvihill, supra note 131. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. 
138. See Mansnerus, supra note 127. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
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a seasonal rental,141 and its mayor notes that if the result is two less 
high school students for the next four years, the town will save 
$100,000. 142 
E. Virginia 
In Falls Church, Virginia-a Washington, D.C. suburb-the devel-
oper of an eighty-unit condominium has agreed to pay $15,000 annu-
ally for every child in excess of eight living in its building, and to limit 
the number of three bedroom units to twelve. 143 It is questionable 
whether such a policy will comport with the FHA.144 The mayor ex-
plains that "we have an exploding school population, and we are try-
ing to come to grips with the cost of building a new school."145 Also, 
"[t]he city would like to share in [the developer's] profit."146 
In Fairfax County, Virginia, another D.C. suburb, developers must 
pay an impact fee of $7,500 for each child expected to occupy the 
development. 147 Fairfax County, although ranked as the least sprawl-
ing county in the D.C. suburbs,148 still has large areas affected by 
sprawl. In a six square mile area of Occoquan, five-acre lots 
predominate.149 In neighboring Loudoun County, two-thirds of the 
county's land area has been limited to one house per ten to twenty 
acres. 150 Fiscal reasons have figured in these policies, as Loudoun 
County planners have determined that a single-family house worth 
less than $439,000 will not pay its own way.151 
The combination of sprawl zoning, insufficient planned residential 
densities near employment centers to support workforce housing, and 
inadequate roads and public transportation networks in northern Vir-
ginia tend to confirm the predictions of the GMU Analysis and are of 
concern to public and private sector leaders. 152 The Tysons Corner 
area of Fairfax County is emerging as a textbook example of the prob-
lem. Tysons Corner is home to the nation's tenth largest shopping 
141. [d. 
142. See id. 
143. See Peter Whoriskey, No Kids? That's No Problem; Falls Church's Deal with 
Builder Highlights Area School Crowding, WASH. POST, May 25, 2003, at AI. 
144. See Slants and Trends, 31 LAND USE REP. 89, 89 (2003). 
145. See Whoriskey, supra note 143. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. 
148. See Stein, supra note 67. 
149. See Whoriskey, supra note 20. 
150. See id. 
151. [d. The political winds, however, may be shifting in Loudoun County. See 
Michael Land & Gloria Glods, Loudoun GOP Eases Growth Restraints, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 6, 2004, at AI. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that Loudoun 
County has become the fastest growing county in the nation. See D'Vera 
Cohn and Michael Laris, Loudoun Leads Nation in Growth, WASH. POST, Apr. 
9, 2004, at A8. See also Miller, supra note 32. 
152. See generally Neil Irwin, Change Around the Corner; Steep Rents, Traffic Threatens 
Tysons Status as Region's Commercial Center, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2003, at EI. 
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mall and more Fortune 500 company headquarters than anywhere else 
in the Metropolitan area.153 Serious questions, however, are being 
raised about the continued economic viability and livability of Tysons 
Corner, due in no small part to its 1960s-style suburban design.154 
Tysons' status as a commercial hub is in jeopardy "because businesses 
are balking at traffic congestion and high rents."155 Approximately 
100,000 people work in Tysons, but it has "only 5,700 homes and no 
rail transportation, resulting in hellacious traffic jams."156 More than 
five million square feet of office space are vacant, as the owners and 
developers seek to make Tysons more urban by replacing the current 
crop of fifteen-story buildings with thirty-story structures. 157 Their 
plans are supported by the Coalition for Smart Growth.158 The resis-
tance to workforce housing in Maryland, California, Florida, Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey and Virginia is typical of that being encountered 
in many states, and reflects a growing problem nationwide. 
VIII. CHALLENGING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING REGULATIONS 
AND POLICIES IN THE COURTS 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
In examining possible judicial challenges to exclusionary zoning in 
Maryland, other responses, such as seeking relief in the state legisla-
ture or otherwise using the political process to achieve reform, should 
also be considered. This alternative is not discussed at length here 
because it is not within the scope of this inquiry. Based on prior expe-
rience, however, one could easily conclude that this is not a viable 
alternative for many reasons, not the least of which is the failure of the 
political process to adequately address, much less resolve, the problem 
over the last twenty-five years. A significant reason for this failure is 
the lack of political will. A quarter-century ago, speaking of the "fun-
damental values" inherent in the right to be free of "law-imposed dis-
crimination based upon income," the ABA Advisory Commission on 
Housing and Urban Growth (the "ABA Advisory Commission" or the 
"Commission") reported: 
History indicates the unlikelihood that these values will be 
satisfactorily vindicated in the absence of judicial interven-
tion. State legislatures have shown little willingness to fash-
ion political structures that permit effective representation 
of the interests of nonresident regional population in land-
use planning and regulatory decisions having to do with 
153. See id. 
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housing. Rather, power has been vested, and remains, at the 
local level, and those adversely affected by parochial exclu-
sionary decisions have little if any voice in their formulation 
and few effective political means to overturn them. 159 
Moreover, the land use planning and zoning processes and the 
post-zoning development review process in Maryland are so open-en-
ded as to make it virtually impossible to effect reform, or to apply 
"smart growth principles" in a meaningful way. The reality is that citi-
zens opposed to sprawl are often also opposed to density. As previ-
ously noted, they are politically powerful, and can readily "game" the 
system in many ways to effect delay and otherwise undermine the pro-
cess by which development applications are reviewed. This is not sur-
prising in light of a recent poll paid for by the National Association of 
Home Builders, which found that approximately seventy percent of 
citizens nationwide prefer to live in a single-family dwelling on a half-
acre lot in the suburbs (the "American dream"), rather than live in a 
more compact residence in compact urban surroundings. 16o All of 
this suggests that it is extremely unlikely that reforms can be achieved 
through the political process. 
1. Evaluating a Local Government's Receptivity to Workforce 
Housing 
Before resorting to litigation, it is prudent to review the state plan-
ning and zoning enabling act as well as the local government's plans, 
regulations, and policies to determine whether it is open to accommo-
dating workforce housing. The following potential "danger signals" 
warrant special examination: 
(1) The State Planning and Zoning Enabling Act - Does it contain a 
statement of purpose or a "vision statement" strongly asserting the 
need for housing in general, and affordable housing in particular?161 
(2) The Comprehensive Plan - Does it include a housing element 
and an affordable housing element?162 
159. A.B.A., ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWfH, HOUSING FOR 
ALL UNDER THE LAw: NEW DIRECTIONS IN HOUSING, LAND USE AND PLAN-
NING LAw, 136-37 (Richard P. Fishman ed. 1978) (citations omitted) [here-
inafter HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAW]. 
160. See NAT'L AsS'N OF HOME BUILDERS, SMART GROWfH, SMART CHOICES, Con-
sumer Choices Shape Communities 6 (2002), available at http://www.nahb.org/ 
publication_details.aspx?publicationID=15 (last visited April 14, 2004). 
161. For example, the "Visions" statement found at the outset of Maryland's 
principal planning and zoning enabling act makes no reference whatsoever 
to housing or to affordable housing. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1.01 
(2003). 
162. Maryland's principal planning and zoning enabling act, Article 66B, Sec-
tion 3.05-entitled "The Plan"-does not include housing as a mandated 
element of a local government's comprehensive plan; it simply authorizes 
such an element to be included at the discretion of the local government. 
[d. § 3.05. 
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(3) Capital Improvement Program/Budget - Is funding provided 
to timely implement the comprehensive plan recommendations re-
garding roads, schools and other infrastructure needed to support 
planned growth, including residential development?163 
(4) Zoning Regulations - Do the local zoning regulations and zon-
ing map allow residential uses at sufficiently high densities in planned 
growth areas to support workforce housing-apartments, townhouses, 
and single-family dwellings on small lots? 
• To promote efficient use of land, are "minimum densities" re-
quired in, e.g., central business districts, areas adjacent to 
public transportation hubs, and subway stations; or 
• Is the zoning map dominated by large lot "sprawl" zoning? 
(5) Growth Management Program - Do the growth management 
plans and regulations restrict residential development while imposing 
few, if any restrictions upon non-residential development (i.e., office, 
retail and industrial)? 
(6) Post-Zoning Development Review Process - Do regulations and 
procedures pertaining to subdivision, site plan and related post-zon-
ing reviews implement the comprehensive plan by prioritizing the 
processing of housing and affordable housing applications on sites lo-
cated in planned high density growth areas? 
(7) Adequate Public Facilities Ordinances (APFO) 
• Does the APFO apply to all categories of development, or 
only to residential development?164 
• Does the APFO provide flexible criteria and/or waivers to fa-
cilitate development of workforce housing in planned high 
density growth areas? 
(8) Moratoria - Is there a history of imposing development mora-
toria primarily upon residential development, while other use catego-
ries, such as office, retail and industrial, are not affected? 
163. For example, to accommodate planned growth and relieve gridlock in the 
congested Washington, D.C. region, a "Proposed Outer Freeway," located 
approximately four miles north of the existing Capital Beltway, with a 
bridge crossing into Virginia, was shown on the "Master Plan for Potomac-
Traville and Vicinity," adopted by the Maryland-National Capital Park and 
Planning Commission (M-NCPPC) on February 16, 1966, and approved by 
the Montgomery County Council on February 7, 1967 (copy on file at M-
NCPPC and with the author). The Outer Freeway has yet to be funded or 
built. 
164. Two widely heralded growth management cases exemplify this problem. 
See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 
(N.Y. 1972) (noting that the timed development control ordinance applied 
only to residential development); Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. 
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that growth cap ordinance 
applied only to residential development). 
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(9) Development Taxes/Impact Fees - Are these taxes and fees im-
posed disproportionately upon new residential development while ex-
isting residential and non-residential uses get a "free ride"?165 
(10) Buildable Land Inventories - Is the local government re-
quired to maintain an inventory of buildable residential land and es-
tablish a land market monitoring system to periodically evaluate the 
supply and availability of buildable land?166 
The answers to these questions will obviously reveal much about a 
local government's willingness to provide meaningful opportunities 
for workforce housing. 
2. Determining the Nature of the Challenge 
In considering the litigation alternative, it is first necessary to deter-
mine whether a challenge should be mounted in federal court, state 
court, or possibly both. Then one must consider whether to file a 
facial challenge to a local government's zoning regulations, or alterna-
tively, to apply for approval of a site-specific housing development, 
obtain a "final" decision, and if that decision is a denial, initiate litiga-
tion by way of an appeal or a declaratory judgment action. This is 
known as an "as applied" suit. 
A facial challenge would likely be decided more quickly, but the risk 
of an unsuccessful result is greater because such actions are less fa-
vored and the burden of proof is very high. Judges prefer to review a 
final decision indicating how the regulation has been applied to a spe-
cific property. On the other hand, as applied challenges can be time 
consuming and, if brought in a Maryland court, could involve the 
challenger in an on the record appeal. Often in Maryland, record 
appeals must first be filed with an administrative agency, such as a 
county board of appeals, and this administrative remedy must be ex-
165. New development is often responsible for only a small portion (often well 
under twenty percent) of the need for new schools, roads and infrastruc-
ture. See, e.g., the 1994 Report to the Montgomery County, Maryland 
County Council of the Working Group On Infrastructure FinanCing ap-
pointed by the Montgomery County Council, available in the Council Of-
fice Building, Information Office, Rockville, Maryland. The report states 
that new development should contribute approximately fourteen percent 
of $90 million to $100 million to be raised annually to cover budget 
shortfalls for new road construction. Id. The remaining eighty-six percent 
was to be divided evenly between automobile users and general taxpayers 
via a statewide tax on automobiles and a transportation utility tax. Id. See 
John J. Delaney, lWads And The Return Of The Three Legged Stool, THE GA-
ZEITE (Montgomery County, Md.), Oct. 18,2002, at All. 
166. Maintaining a buildable lot inventory and a land market monitoring system 
are strongly recommended by the American Planning Association (AP A) . 
SeeAM. PlANNING AsS'N, GRm'lING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, § 7-204.1 
(Stuart Meek, ed., 2002). 
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hausted before one may proceed to court. 167 In record appeals, as 
opposed to declaratory judgment suits, the court does not conduct a 
de novo trial or hear testimony, but merely reviews the record to deter-
mine whether the agency's decision was in accordance with applicable 
law and reasonable, whether there was substantial evidence to support 
it. 168 Deference is accorded to the agency's decision on the evidence, 
especially if it is a legislative one. Declaratory judgment actions can 
proceed directly to court, where the judge conducts a de novo hearing, 
is the trier of fact, and also determines issues of law.169 We will first 
examine the federal courts. 
B. The Federal Courts 
As noted in the Introduction, federal courts have generally not af-
forded relief to challengers claiming that a local government's zoning 
laws exclude persons based upon their income in violation of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In a number of important exclusionary zoning cases, the Supreme 
Court has either denied standing to the plaintiffs or, when consider-
ing the merits, has required proof of a governmental intent to make 
housing unavailable on racial grounds. 170 This imposes a virtually in-
surmountable burden of proof upon plaintiffs. 171 As noted previ-
ously, the Court has determined that access to affordable housing is 
not among the "fundamental" rights protected by the Constitution. 172 
To date, no Fourteenth Amendment attack on an alleged broad-based 
exclusionary zoning scheme has been upheld in the high court. 
Conversely, the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, have fa-
vorably considered exclusionary suits filed under the FHA.173 In these 
cases, an effect, rather than an intent, test is employed to determine if 
167. Fosler v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., 376 Md. 1l8, 127, 829 A.2d 271, 276 
(2003) (citing McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 614, 552 A.2d 881, 886 
(1989)) . 
168. See infra Part IX.C & D.3. 
169. See infra discussion Part IX.D.2, 3. 
170. See infra Part VIII.B.l, 2. 
171. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
173. As described by Professors Daniel Mandelker and John Payne: 
The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3617, generally forbids ra-
cial discrimination in housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) provides in 
part that "it shall be unlawful ... [t]o make unavailable or deny ... 
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin." Although the statute does not explicitly mention 
zoning, the courts have held that discrimination in zoning ordi-
nances makes housing "unavailable" under the statute. Much of 
the exclusionary zoning litigation in the federal courts has been 
based on allegations that local land use controls, as applied, violate 
the Fair Housing Act. 
D. MANDELKER &J. PAYNE, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT; 
CASES AND MATERIALS 404 (5th ed. 2001) (emphasis added). 
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there has been a disproportionate impact, for example, on families 
with children or persons of a particular race. 174 If so, a prima facie case 
of disproportionate impact is made and the burden shifts to the de-
fendant government to justify its actions. 175 To date, no case has in-
volved alleged violations of the FHA for making housing unavailable 
to persons based solely upon their income or economic status. The 
Supreme Court has also upheld a site-specific challenge, based on 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds, to a city's denial 
of a permit for a group home for mentally retarded persons. 176 
A suit in federal court against a Maryland county, alleging federal 
due process and equal protection violations (because local zoning reg-
ulations improperly exclude citizens of modest economic means from 
accessing affordable housing in that county) would be problematic 
due to standing hurdles and case precedent. On the other hand, a 
site specific as applied suit under the FHA challenging the denial of a 
permit for a specific project could succeed if the plaintiff, in addition 
to being of modest means, was also a member of one of the classes of 
citizens protected by the FHA. 177 
1. Standing in Federal Court 
The question of standing has been a major problem for minorities 
and civil rights groups when attacking exclusionary land use practices 
in federal courts. Two legal foundations exist for the doctrine of 
standing in federal court. Article III of the U.S. Constitution, autho-
rizes the federal judiciary to decide "only cases or controversies."178 
Thus, there must be an actual 'dispute' between two parties and the 
interest of the plaintiff will be affected by the judgment of the court: 
When a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue, the relevant 
inquiry is whether, assuming justicability of the claim, the 
plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be 
regressed by a favorable decision. Absent such a showing, 
exercise of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous 
and thus inconsistent with the Art. III limitation. I '7'9 
The Supreme Court's concept of its proper role within the frame-
work of the Constitution has narrowed over the years: 
174. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 884 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
175. [d. at 936. 
176. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
177. Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 738 (1995) (holding that the 
city's ordinance which defined "family" so as to preclude group homes for 
recovering alcoholics and drug addicts in residential zones violated the 
FHA). 
178. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. l. 
179. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). 
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• A party may assert rights under a statutory or constitutional 
provision only if the party lies within the "zone of interest" in-
tended to be protected by said provision; 180 and 
• Standing is denied to a party asserting "a generalized grievance 
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of 
citizens."181 
z. The Warth Case 
Due process and equal protection challenges under the Fourteenth 
Amendment are difficult to prove on their merits. Before reaching 
the merits, however, a litigant must have standing. The Supreme 
Court, in Warth v. Seldin, adopted extremely strict and controversial 
standing rules for exclusionary zoning cases. 182 In Warth, various 
plaintiffs attacked a system of land use ordinances and plans for the 
Town of Penfield, near Rochester, New York, under §§ 1981-1983 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 183 Their claim was that "the town's zon-
ing ordinance, by its terms ... effectively excluded persons of low and 
moderate income from living in the town."184 
An array of plaintiffs were involved including: a local housing advo-
cacy group representing residents and non-residents of the town; an-
other association representing non-profit housing sponsors; individual 
taxpayers from the nearby City of Rochester (who claimed that as a 
result of the town's policies, the city was required to build more low-
income housing, thereby increasing their tax burdens); low and mod-
erate-income residents from the Rochester area who were also mem-
bers of minority racial or ethnic groups (who claimed that they had 
been unsuccessful in locating adequate affordable housing in the 
community); and the Rochester Homebuilders Association. 185 All 
were denied standing. I86 
The Supreme Court, affirming the lower courts' dismissal of all par-
ties for lack of standing, held that low-income residents of Rochester 
did not have standing because they did not, and apparently could not, 
allege facts showing that the ordinances caused them concrete harm 
that judicial relief would personally benefit them in a tangible way.I87 
They could not show the requisite causal connection because they had 
no interest in land subject to regulations and could not identify third 
180. Ass'n of Data Processing Servo Org. V. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
181. Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
182. [d. 
183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (2001). A § 1983 claim, coupled with a request for 
damages and/or attorney's fees, could also be included in an FHA chal-
lenge. See infra Part IX.B. 
184. Warth, 422 U.S. at 493. 
185. [d. at 493-94. 
186. [d. at 517-18. 
187. [d. at 507-08. 
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parties who might build low-income housing. 188 The developers of 
low-income housing in the region lacked standing because the com-
plaint referred to no specific project that was currently precluded by 
the ordinances. 189 Thus, the developers "failed to show the existence 
of any injury to its members of sufficient immediacy and ripeness to 
warrant judicial intervention."19o The association, representing re-
sidents of the defendant town, had its claim of injury (based on pre-
clusion from living in an integrated community) rejected because it 
was insufficient under prudential considerations to allow them 
standing.191 
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the Warth majority, 
stating in part: 
Because of this scheme, those interested in building homes 
for the excluded groups were faced with insurmountable dif-
ficulties, and those of the excluded groups seeking homes in 
the locality quickly learned that their attempts were futile. 
Yet, the Court turns the very success of the allegedly unconstitutional 
scheme into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its invalidation. In ef-
fect, the Court tells the low income minority and building 
company plaintiffs they will not be permitted to prove what 
they have alleged-that they could and would build and live 
in the town if changes were made in the zoning ordinance 
and its application-because they have not succeeded in 
breaching, before the suit was filed, the very barriers which 
are the subject of the suit. 192 
As noted, Warth has been heavily criticized. 193 According to the 
ABA Advisory Commission, the Warth decision indicates that the Su-
preme Court will decline to adjudicate challenges to municipal land 
use regulations unless specific housing developments are being pro-
posed. 194 Warth has been described as a disaster for exclusionary zon-
ing challengers. One commentator notes that "[t]he majority in 
Warth strongly suggests that standing to challenge exclusionary zoning 
restraints will be recognized when, and only when, there is a specific 
housing project that is being denied development permission."195 
That prediction appears to have been borne out by the Supreme 
Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. 196 Cleburne 
188. [d. at 505-07. 
189. [d. at 516. 
190. [d. 
191. [d. at 512,514. 
192. [d. at 523 (Brennan,j., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
193. See HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 79-84, 129-30, 136; 
Lawrence G. Sager, Questions [ Wish [ Neuer Asked: The Berger Court in £.xclu-
sionary Zoning, 11 Sw. U. L. REv. 509, 517 (1979). 
194. See HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 79. 
195. See Sager, supra note 193, at 517. 
196. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
184 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
involved a denial of a special use permit to operate a group home for 
the mentally retarded. 197 The decision to deny the permit was held to 
have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 198 The Court, however, has declined to rule that minimally de-
cent housing opportunities are a fundamental interest worthy of 
Constitutional protection. 199 
The ABA Advisory Commission concluded that the Wanh Court 
"conceived too narrowly its role in land use litigation," and that while 
"state courts may be preferable forums for dealing with broad chal-
lenges to municipal land use regulations, it does not follow that the 
door to federal courts should be closed when federal constitutional or 
statutory rights are asserted."20o They further stated: 
[We noted] with approval the recent critical findings of the 
Council for Public Interest law that: 
A substantial number of important cases involving ag-
grieved parties prepared to litigate issues on the merits 
have been dismissed by the federal courts on technical 
grounds under new, shifting, and progressively more strin-
gent procedural rulings. In consequence, many citizens, 
including minorities, the poor, and victims of official 
abuses, have been left without judicial remedies. As the 
courts have turned from the substance of justice to the 
niceties of pleading, citizens have found greater cause for 
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. 201 
The Commission's comments, made twenty-five years ago, are still 
relevant today. Except where denial of a specific development propo-
salon a specific site is at issue,202 the Court will not entertain equal 
protection claims, and instead will relegate plaintiffs to the narrower 
channels of the FHA (where protected class status is not extended to 
persons who are denied access to affordable housing based upon their 
income or economic condition)203 or similar statutes, such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) .204 Standing under the FHA 
197. Id. at 435. 
198. Id. 
199. See infra Part VIII.B.2 (discussing Belle Terre and Arlington Heights). 
200. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 80. 
201. Id. (citing COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST, BAlANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: 
FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAw IN AMERICA 357 (1976». 
202. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (holding that the denial of a special use 
permit for a group home for the mentally retarded violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause). 
203. See HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 81-83. 
204. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2002). See JOHN D. DE-
LANEY, S. ABRAMS & F. SCHNIDMAN, LAND USE PRACTICE AND FORMS: HAN-
DLING THE LAND USE CASE, 22.3.1 (2d ed. 2003). "The Supreme Court has 
held that plaintiffs" filing suit "under the ADA (and the Rehabilitation Act) 
are not entitled to punitive damages .... " Id. (citing Barnes v. Gorman, 
536 U.S. 181 (2002». Nevertheless, "they are meeting with success in en-
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requires a showing of an injury in fact and the likelihood that court 
action can address the injury.205 
2. Significant Decisions of the Supreme Court and Federal Courts in 
Exclusionary Zoning Cases 
i. The Village of Belle Terre Case 
The United States Supreme Court and federal district and appellate 
courts have not been overly receptive to exclusionary zoning chal-
lenges. One reason for this is that the Court does not consider the 
right to a house a fundamental right. It said as much in 1972 in Lind-
sey v. Normet,206 and repeated it two years later in the major Supreme 
Court decision Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.207 
Belle Terre was the Court's first review of a significant land use case 
since 1926, when it rejected a challenge to the validity of a local zon-
ing ordinance in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Company.208 In Belle Terre, the Court upheld two zoning ordinances 
that completely excluded apartments and boarding or lodging 
houses.209 Furthermore, the ordinances defined family to include un-
limited numbers of persons living in a single household who are re-
lated by blood, adoption or marriage, while excluding more than two 
persons living together in a single household if they are unrelated.21o 
The federal appellate court held that the ordinance was invalid based 
on equal protection grounds as an attempt to regulate lifestyle.211 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate court, finding 
again "no fundamental right" to be involved, "such as voting, the right 
of association, the right of access to the courts," or, apparently, the 
right to a house.212 
Despite the obvious exclusionary effect of the ordinances, which 
Justice Marshall in his dissent characterized as an improper regulation 
of "lifestyle" and a violation of "fundamental" Constitutional interests 
forcing the ADA in a growing number of cases." [d. For example, in Bay 
Area Addiction Research and Treatment v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 
1999), "the city'S enactment of an 'emergency ordinance' prohibiting the 
operation of methadone clinics within 500 feet of residential areas" was 
found to be a failure to provide reasonable accommodation as required 
under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. [d. "The 
Ninth Circuit has also held that sidewalk maintenance and accessibility ... 
for people with disabilities fall within the scope of the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act." [d. (citing Barden v. Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
205. See Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). 
206. 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). 
207. 416 U.S. 1,7 (1974). 
208. See 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
209. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2 (1974). 
210. [d. 
211. See Boraas v. Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1973). 
212. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 7. 
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including privacy and freedom of association,213 the Court, speaking 
through Justice Douglas, deferentially noted: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... 
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aes-
thetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legis-
lature to determine that the community should be beautiful 
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as 
well as carefully patrolled. 
We deal with economic and social legislation where legisla-
tures have historically drawn lines which we respect against 
the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the 
law be "reasonable, not arbitrary" and bears "a rational rela-
tionship to a [permissible] state objective."214 
In other words, the Belle Terre Court, in rejecting the plaintiffs' equal 
protection claims, viewed the case as merely involving social and eco-
nomic legislation, not as presenting a civil liberties issue. 
zz. The Arlington Heights Case 
Similarly, in Village oj Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp., the Court faced another Fourteenth Amendment due 
process and equal protection challenge arising from the Village's dis-
approval of a proposed subsidized, racially integrated housing devel-
opment.215 The Court rejected the challenge, ruling that in order to 
prove a Fourteenth Amendment violation of equal protection, it must 
be demonstrated that the Village had an intent to discriminate on ra-
cial grounds.216 In so ruling, the Court followed its decision a year 
earlier in Washington v. Davis, where it held that unintended racial 
consequences from official actions do not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.217 The Arlington Heights Court remanded the case for further 
consideration under the FHA, under which it is unlawful to make 
housing unavailable "because of race, color, religion, sex, familial sta-
tus, or national origin [or handicap]. "218 
For all practical purposes, an intent test, such as that in Arlington 
Heights, makes it virtually impossible to prove a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment because the local government can always cite a 
213. Id. at 13 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
214. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 6,8 (citations omitted). 
215. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
216. Id. at 265. 
217. 426 U.S. 229, 244-46 (1976). 
218. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271; see 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2001); see alm Hunt-
ington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988) (involv-
ing an FHA challenge, effect test; where the court applied a "disparate 
impact" or "disparate effect" test to determine whether a facially neutral 
practice under a zoning ordinance adversely impacted a specific group pro-
tected under the Act). 
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valid police power reason for its action. One commentator argues 
that there should be a "presumption that the decision is race 
dependent."219 
Respected commentators have interpreted Arlington Heights as an 
"implicit endorsement of economic exclusionary zoning."22o For ex-
ample, Professor Daniel R. Mandelker has severely criticized the in-
tent test and its impact upon litigants who challenge exclusionary 
zoning schemes: 
The Supreme Court's decision in Arlington Heights has fore-
closed a finding of racially discriminatory intent in all but the most 
blatant cases. Unless a municipality has historically discrimi-
nated against zoning proposals for subsidized housing, or 
unless the municipality abruptly changes a zoning classifica-
tion or otherwise acts affirmatively to frustrate the construc-
tion of a subsidized housing development, no opportunity 
for proving the existence of racially discriminatory intent ap-
pears present. Moreover, none of these events is likely to 
surface. Developers facing a hostile municipality are unlikely 
to challenge that municipality's zoning to any great extent, 
so that no "clear pattern" of discrimination is likely to 
emerge.221 
3. The Referendum Cases 
i. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises 
Although not directly relevant to the principal inquiry in this paper, 
the manner in which the Supreme Court has responded to referenda 
attacking proposed housing projects for lower income citizens is both 
instructive and discouraging. The Court has been equally unsympa-
thetic to the interests of builders, sponsors and erstwhile residents of 
these facilities. In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., a charter 
amendment authorizing a city-wide referendum on a proposed multi-
family housing facility, which was pending review by the city, was hast-
ily adopted.222 Not surprisingly, the city rejected the project in the 
subsequent referendum.223 The charter amendment required the 
builder to pay for the referendum and to obtain a super-majority fifty-
five percent vote in order to prevai1.224 Nevertheless, the Court up-
219. See Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Ap-
praisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1037 (1979). 
220. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CAsES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 498 (3d ed. 
1999). 
221. Daniel R. Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspec-
tive on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1217, 1239 (1997) (emphasis 
added). 
222. 426 U.S. 668, 670 (1976). 
223. Id. at 671. 
224. See Forest City Enters., Inc. v. Eastlake, 324 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ohio 1975). 
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held the referendum as a valid reservation of legislative power to the 
people.225 The Supreme Court of Ohio, which had rejected the char-
ter amendment's obvious purpose to exclude low-income people as 
"crudely apparent," characterized the piecemeal rezoning process as 
legislative, and found the referendum to be an improper delegation 
oflegislative authority to the people.226 In overruling the Ohio court, 
the Supreme Court also noted, without further explanation, that if the 
results of the referendum were unfair to the builder, it could bring a 
due process claim or apply for a variance.227 This decision has been 
heavily criticized.228 
lZ. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation 
In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, the 
Supreme Court went even further by extending the right of referen-
dum to administrative as well as legislative decisions of local governing 
bodies.229 A site plan application for an affordable housing project 
was approved by the city council through a city ordinance.23o A citi-
zen group filed a petition for referendum pursuant to the City Char-
ter, which was eventually passed, repealing the ordinance.231 Buckeye 
contended that the Ohio Constitution does not authorize popular ref-
erendums on administrative matters.232 The Supreme Court of Ohio, 
in an earlier state court proceeding, had agreed, ruling that the Ohio 
Constitution authorizes referendums only in relation to legislative 
acts, not administrative acts such as the site plan ordinance.233 By the 
time the matter was before the United States Supreme Court, Buckeye 
had been issued permits and had commenced construction.234 Buck-
eye had also initiated suit in federal court against the city, raising 
equal protection and due process claims as well as claims under the 
FHA, resulting from delays caused by the referendum.235 
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, held that 
the city's action in putting a site-plan ordinance to referendum did 
not violate equal protection because there was no evidence indicating 
that the city gave effect to any racial bias that may have motivated the 
citizens who sought the referendum.236 As to the referendum issue, 
225. See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 671-74 (1976). 
226. See id. at 671-72, 689. 
227. See id. at 677. 
228. See, e.g., HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 274-76. 
229. 538 U.S. 188, 198 (2003). 
230. [d. at 191. 
231. [d. at 191-92. 
232. [d. at 198. 
233. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 697 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ohio 
1998). 
234. See Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 193. 
235. [d. at 197-98. 
236. [d. at 198. 
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the Court, citing Eastlake, held that subjecting the site-plan ordinance 
to the city's referendum process "regardless of whether that ordinance re-
flected an administrative or legislative decision" did not amount to per se 
arbitrary government conduct under the Due Process Clause.237 This 
was surprising to say the least. No credence was given to the Supreme Court 
of Ohio's decision that the State Constitution's referendum provision did not 
apply to administrative acts. Rather, the Court stated that by allowing 
the referendum process to proceed under its charter, the city "was 
advancing significant First Amendment interests."238 As previously 
noted, the use of initiatives and referenda to defeat affordable hous-
ing proposals is proliferating.239 
C. Challenges to Exclusionary Zoning Under State Constitutions and Laws 
1. Standing Requirements in State Courts 
Although the Supreme Court's standing requirements in exclusion-
ary zoning cases, as exemplified by Warth, are exceedingly strict, some 
state courts have taken a different view. A New York court had this to 
say: 
Warth graphically illustrates that it is the policy of the 
United States Supreme Court to restrict access to the Federal 
judicial process under the case and controversy clause and 
the prudential limitation doctrine. The unmistakable cur-
rent trend relative to standing in this State, however, is to 
depart from the harsh requirements of the past which lim-
ited access to the judicial forum of those seeking to redress 
the illegality of legislation and official action.240 
In Mount Laurel 1,241 the Supreme Court of New Jersey liberally con-
ferred standing to the plaintiff, NAACP, and associations representing 
builders and housing advocacy groupS.242 
2. Significant Decisions of State Courts 
A small number of state courts, relying upon their state constitu-
tions and laws, have favorably considered challenges to zoning laws 
that have had the effect of excluding citizens from having access to 
affordable housing because of their income or economic status. Most 
notable among these is New Jersey, where the state high court has 
addressed the issue of economic discrimination in housing in several 
237. Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
238. Id. at 196. 
239. See Perkins, supra note 117. 
240. Suffolk Hous. SeIV. v. Brookhaven, 397 N.Y.S.2d 302, 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1977), modified, 405 N.Y.S 2d 302 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), affd, 70 N.Y.2d 122 
(1987). 
241. Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975). 
242. Id. at 717 n.3. 
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important decisions stretching over a quarter century.243 In one such 
case, a town enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting more than four 
unrelated persons from sharing a single housing unit and cited Belle 
Terre in an attempt to justify it. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
stated that while Belle Terre may have been dispositive of any federal 
questions, the decision it was making was based in part upon the New 
Jersey Constitution. 244 The Belle Terre reasoning was rejected as "unper-
suasive" and inconsistent with prior decisions of the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey.245 
Pennsylvania and New Hampshire courts have also weighed in 
prominently to invalidate exclusionary land use policies under their 
state constitutions or zoning enabling acts. Thus, we will review deci-
sions from New Jersey as well as Pennsylvania and New Hampshire. 
i. New Jersey 
a. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 
(Mount Laurell)246 
Whereas in Belle Terre, the Supreme Court confirmed its earlier 
holding in Lindsey v. Normef47 that the right to housing was not a "fun-
damental right,"248 it was regarded as a "most basic human need" in 
Mount Laurel 1 249 Additionally, where Arlington Heights has been char-
acterized as at least an "implicit endorsement of economic exclusion-
ary zoning,"250 Mount Laurel I was a ringing refutation of this concept 
and invalidation of an entire system of land use regulation based upon 
economic class distinctions. Shortly after Mount Laurel I was decided, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey undertook what the United States 
Supreme Court "eschewed" in Warth, namely a challenge "on exclu-
sionary grounds, against the entire system of land use ordinances, plans, 
and policies of a jurisdiction. "251 "[N] ot only was [the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey] willing to address income-related barriers, but it also re-
fused to limit the judicial role to one of testing the validity of a partic-
ular regulation applied to a particular proposed development."252 
243. See, e.g., Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983); State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368 
(NJ. 1979); Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713; Vickers v. Township Comm. of 
Gloucester, 181 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1962), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 
U.S. 233 (1963). 
244. See Baker, 405 A.2d at 373-74. 
245. Id. at 374. 
246. 336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975). 
247. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
248. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974). 
249. 336 A.2d at 727. 
250. DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 220, at 498 n.1. 
251. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 136 (emphasis 
added). 
252. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey based its Mount Laurel I holding 
on the substantive due process and equal protection provisions of the 
New Jersey-not the United States--Constitution.253 This was no acci-
dent; the Supreme Court had decided Belle Terre only a year before, 
and the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Mount Laurel I obviously rec-
ognized the importance of drawing a distinction on equal protection 
grounds between the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution and the more stringent standards of the New 
Jersey Constitution. 
The Township of Mount Laurel is located in close proximity to Phil-
adelphia and Camden, and was characterized by the court as a devel-
oping community.254 Approximately two-thirds of its land was vacant, 
and approximately seventy percent of its land was zoned for low den-
sity, single-family detached homes on large lots.255 Most of the re-
maining land was zoned for industrial uses, with a tiny amount zoned 
commercia1.256 None of the township's land was zoned for multiple-
family housing or for mobile homes.257 The township candidly ac-
knowledged that its land use regulations were intended to be exclu-
sionary, but it asserted that these practices were in the best fiscal 
interest of the municipality and its inhabitants.258 The court noted 
that "[t]here cannot be the slightest doubt that the reason for this 
course of conduct has been to keep down local taxes on property ... 
and that the policy was carried out without regard for non-fiscal con-
siderations with respect to people, either within or without its 
boundaries."259 
The Mount Laurel I opinion was authored by Supreme Court of New 
Jersey Justice Frederick W. Hall, who only a decade before in a famous 
dissent in Vickers v. Gloucester Townshit?60 strongly criticized the use of 
zoning ordinances to regulate the lifestyle and housing choice of citi-
zens. The ordinance in Vickers totally excluded mobile homes from 
the township and was upheld by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.261 
In his dissent, Justice Hall stated: 
In my opinion, legitimate use of the zoning power by such 
municipalities does not encompass the right to erect barri-
cades on their boundaries through exclusion or too tight re-
striction of uses where the real purpose is to prevent feared 
disruption with a so-called chosen way of life. Nor does it en-
253. Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 728. 
254. See id. at 718. 
255. See id. at 718-19. 
256. See id. at 719. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 718. 
259. Id. at 723. 
260. 181 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1962), eert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 
(1963). 
261. Id. at 136. 
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compass provisions designed to let in as new residents only certain 
kinds oj people, or those who can afford to live in Javored kinds oj 
housing, or to keep down tax bills oj present property owners. When 
one of the above is the true situation, deeper considerations 
intrinsic in a free society gain the ascendency and courts 
must not be hesitant to strike down purely selfish and un-
democratic enactments.262 
In 1975, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court of New Jersey, Jus-
tice Hall in Mount Laurel I invalidated Mount Laurel's general zoning 
ordinance, which permitted only single-family detached dwellings on 
large lots, because it failed to provide a "realistic opportunity" for the 
development of low and moderate-income housing.263 As noted, the 
court relied upon the substantive due process and equal protection 
provisions of the "more demanding" New Jersey Constitution,264 
which states that" [a]ll persons are by nature free and independent, 
and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are 
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety 
and happiness."265 The late Supreme Court Justice William J. Bren-
nan, favorably cited Justice Hall's opinion in Mount Laurel I for the 
proposition that state court decisions based upon state constitutions 
"not only cannot be overturned by, but indeed, are not even review-
able by, the United States Supreme Court."266 
A presumptive obligation was placed upon each "developing munic-
ipality," i.e., municipalities in the path of growth, to enact zoning ordi-
nances that would permit sufficient residential development to 
comprise a "fair share" of their region's housing needs.267 In addition 
to emphasizing that equal protection under the New Jersey Constitu-
262. Id. at 147 (Hall,]., dissenting) (emphasis added). In so stating, Justice Hall 
was echoing the words of Federal District Judge Westenhaver eighty years 
ago in Ambler Realty Co. v. Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), striking 
down the discriminatory zoning ordinance of Euclid, Ohio. Id. His deci-
sion was later reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. 
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926), a landmark case first upholding 
comprehensive zoning against claims that they violated Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process and equal protection rights. Judge Westenhaver 
observed: 
The purpose to be accomplished [by the zoning regulation] is re-
ally to regulate the mode of living of persons who may hereafter 
inhabit [the Village]. In the last analysis, the result to be accom-
plished is to classify the population and segregate them according 
to their income or situation in life .... 
Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. at 316. 
263. Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 722, 730. 
264. Id. at 725. 
265. NJ. CONST. art. I, ~ l. 
266. William]. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977). 
267. Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 732-33. 
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tion extended to exclusionary zoning based upon economic class, the 
court also focused upon the concept of regional "general welfare" as a 
basic state constitutional principle.268 Accordingly, a local govern-
ment's land use regulations must also take into account the state's 
important interest in having the housing needs of all income groups 
promoted.269 In other words, "general welfare" includes the welfare 
of the housing market of which the local government is a part. 
The legal issue before the court was phrased by Justice Hall as: 
[W] hether a developing municipality like Mount Laurel may 
validly, by a system of land use regulation, make it physically 
and economically impossible to provide low and moderate 
income housing in the municipality for the various catego-
ries of persons who need and want it and thereby, as Mount 
Laurel has, exclude such people from living within its con-
fines because of the limited extent of their income and re-
sources. Necessarily implicated are the broader questions of 
the right of such municipalities to limit the kinds of available 
housing and of any obligation to make possible a variety and 
choice of types of living accommodations.27o 
In answering this question, the court pulled no punches. It said 
that providing adequate housing for "all categories of people is cer-
tainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare re-
quired in all local land use regulation."271 To do this, "a developing 
municipality . . . must, by its land use regulations, make realistically 
possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing" for low and 
moderate-income citizens.272 The township must affirmatively afford 
that opportunity, at least to the extent of its fair share of the regional 
need for such housing.273 
The court pointed out that zoning, as an exercise of the police 
power, must address itself to the general welfare.274 As to "[w]hose 
general welfare must be served and not violated in the field of land 
use regulation," the court stated: 
[I] t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning 
power is a police power of the state and the local authority is 
acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted in the 
same manner as is the state. So, when regulation does have a 
substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond 
268. See id. at 728. 
269. [d. 
270. [d. at 724. 
271. [d. at 727. 
272. [d. at 731-32. 
273. [d. at 732-33. 
274. [d. at 725. 
194 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
the borders oj the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and 
must be recognized and served. 275 
Thus: 
[T] he presumptive obligation arises for each such munici-
pality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regu-
lations, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate 
variety and choice of housing, including, of course, low and 
moderate cost housing, to meet the needs, desires and re-
sources of all categories of people who may desire to live 
within its boundaries.276 
The term "presumptive" was described as having both procedural 
and substantive aspects.277 Procedurally, it means that "when a devel-
oping municipality through its land use regulations has not made real-
istically possible" an adequate choice of housing, "a facial showing of 
violation of substantive due process or equal protection under the 
state constitution has been made out and the burden ... shifts to the 
municipality to establish a valid basis for its action or non-action."278 
The court then examined the fiscally based reasons advanced by the 
township to sustain its land use regulations: 
In other words, the position is that any municipality may 
zone extensively to seek and encourage the 'good' tax rat-
abIes of industry and commerce and limit the permissible 
types of housing to those having the fewest school children 
or to those providing sufficient value to attain or approach 
paying their own way taxwise.279 
Emphatically rejecting this argument, the court had "no hesitancy in 
now saying, and [doing] so emphatically, that, considering the basic impor-
tance oj the opportunity Jor appropriate housing Jor all classes oj our citizenry, 
no municipality may exclude or limit categories oj housing Jor that reason or 
purpose. "280 
While fully recognizing the heavy burden of local taxes and school 
costs on homeowners, the court stated that relief from such burdens 
would have to come from other branches of government and could 
not be achieved by restricting certain types of housing.281 The court 
concluded: 
By way of summary, what we have said comes down to this. 
As a developing municipality, Mount Laurel must, by its land 
use regulations, make realistically possible the opportunity 
275. Id. at 726 (emphasis added). 
276. Id. at 728. 
277. Id. 
278. [d. 
279. [d. at 730-31. 
280. [d. at 731 (emphasis added). 
281. [d. 
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for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all cate-
gories of people who may desire to live there, of course in-
cluding those of low and moderate income. It must permit 
multifamily housing, without bedroom or similar restrictions, 
as well as small dwellings on very small lots, low cost housing 
of other types and, in general, high density zoning, without 
artificial and unjustifiable minimum requirements as to lot 
size, building size and the like, to meet the full panoply of 
these needs. Certainly when a municipali[t]y zones for in-
dustry and commerce for local tax benefit purposes, it with-
out question must zone to permit adequate housing within 
the means of the employees involved in such uses .... In 
other words, such municipalities must zone primarily for the 
living welfare of people and not for the benefit of the local 
tax rate.282 
After Mount Laurel J, many hurdles were encountered in imple-
menting the court's decision, including lengthy debates over what is a 
"developing community," what is the applicable "region," what is 
meant by a "realistic opportunity" for affordable housing, and what is 
a "community's fair share." After many years of unproductive debate 
over these issues, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its second deci-
sion-Mount Laurel JP83-adopted inclusionary zoning techniques 
such as incentive zoning and mandatory set-asides keyed to construc-
tion of lower income housing.284 The court determined that every 
community designated on the State Development Guide Plan (SDGP) 
as a growth area will have Mount Laurel obligations and be subject to 
court-imposed "builder's remedies" (mandated building permits, vari-
ances) if it fails to meet them.285 In response to the court's recom-
mendation in Mount Laurel II, the New Jersey legislature enacted fair 
housing legislation establishing a new state agency, the Council on 
Affordable Housing (COAH), with "primary jurisdiction for the ad-
ministration of housing obligations in accordance with sound regional 
planning considerations in this State."286 
b. Toll Brothers v. West Windsor Township 
In 2002, in Toll Brothers v. Township of West Windsor, the New Jersey 
high court again reaffirmed the Mount Laurel doctrine and the impor-
tance of the builder's remedy as an enforcement too1.287 The Toll 
Brothers court concluded that when a municipality fails to participate 
in available options provided by the state, including the state's afford-
able housing certification program, it "remains vulnerable to a Mount 
282. Id. at 731-32. 
283. Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983). 
284. Id. at 419. 
285. Id. at 418, 420. 
286. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-302(b), 304(a) (West 2001). 
287. 803 A.2d 53,76-77 (NJ. 2002). 
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Laurel challenge."288 There is no indication that the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey's continuing oversight of its Mount Laurel doctrine will 
slacken in the immediate future. 
As noted, courts in other states, including Pennsylvania, New York, 
California, Washington, and New Hampshire, have emulated to vary-
ing degrees the Mount Laurel concept that zoning ordinances should 
take into account regional housing needs.289 We next review exam-
ples from Pennsylvania and New Hampshire. 
ii. Pennsylvania 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has long been on record in 
holding that when a plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of the unrea-
sonableness of a zoning ordinance, only "some extraordinary justifica-
tion" will vindicate the ordinance.29o In National Land and Investment 
Co. v. Kohn, a famous case that predated Mount Laurel I by a decade, 
the court upheld a challenge to a zoning amendment imposing a 
four-acre minimum lot size in response to unusually rapid urban ex-
pansion.291 To justify its actions, the municipality cited sewage and 
transportation inadequacies, buttressed by a desire to preserve rural 
and historic values.292 The court reacted by saying that zoning is a 
device for facing the future, not denying it. It further stated that "[aJ 
zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance 
of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and other-
wise, upon the administration of public services and facilities can not 
be held valid. "293 
Five years later, in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, again invalidated zoning involving two- and 
three-acre minimum lot sizes, stating: 
The implication of our decision in National Land is that 
communities must deal with problems of population growth. 
They may not refuse to confront the future by adopting zon-
ing regulations that effectively restrict population to near 
present levels. It is not for any given township to say who mayor 
may not live within its confines, while disregarding the interests of 
the entire area. If Concord Township is successful in unnatu-
rally limiting its population growth through the use of exclu-
sive zoning regulations, the people who would normally live 
288. Id. at 92. 
289. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. 
Livermore, 557 P.2d 473,483 (Cal. 1976); Britton v. Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 
496 (N.H. 1991); Berenson v. New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. 1975); 
Willis town v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975); Save a 
Valuable Env't v. Bothell, 576 P.2d 401, 405 (Wash. 1978). 
290. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A.2d 765, 767 (Pa. 1970). 
291. 215 A.2d 597, 613 (Pa. 1965). 
292. Id. at 60S-ll. 
293. Id. at 612. 
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there will inevitably have to live in another community, and 
the requirement that they do so is not a decision that Con-
cord Township should alone be able to make.294 
A 2002 decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, mod-
ified the "extraordinary justification" rule regarding large lot zoning 
in favor of a rule that upholds such zoning unless it is unreasonable, 
arbitrary and not substantially related to legitimate government 
interests.295 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has critically reviewed other 
forms of alleged exclusionary zoning regulations. In Sumck v. Zoning 
Hearing Board of Upper Providence, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
considered a challenge to a zoning board's designation of only 
1.14%of the town's acreage in a zone allowing for multi-family dwell-
ing units.296 Noting the general principle that zoning ordinances 
must bear a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare of the community, the court stated that in prior cases 
it had employed a substantive due process analysis and had concluded 
that "exclusionary or unduly restrictive zoning techniques do not have 
the requisite substantial relationship to the public welfare."297 The 
court ultimately adopted a "fair-share" requirement similar to that es-
tablished in Mount Laurel.298 
In a later case, Fernley v. Board of Supervisors of Schuylkill, Penn-
sylvania's highest court considered an ordinance that totally prohib-
ited multi-family dwelling units.299 Its analysis began by noting that 
where there is a total prohibition of a legitimate use, the burden of 
294. 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (Pa. 1970) (emphasis added). 
295. See C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 
143, 154 (Pa. 2002). For further discussion, see infra note 301 and accom-
panying text. In Appeal oj Girsh, 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970), where a zoning 
ordinance disallowing multiple family dwellings was struck down, the court 
found: 
Nether Providence Township may not permissibly choose to only 
take as many people as can live in single-family housing, in effect 
freezing the population at near present level. ... Municipal ser-
vices must be provided somewhere, and if Nether Providence is a 
logical place for development to take place, it should not be heard 
to say that it will not bear its rightful part of the burden. 
[d. at 398-99. 
296. 382 A.2d 105, 106-07 (Pa. 1977). 
297. [d. at 108. 
298. [d. See also Martin v. Millcreek, 413 A.2d 764, 765 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980). 
The court held: 
[d. 
[Z]oning requirements can ... be invalid because exclusionary or 
because unduly restrictive; ... a zoning limitation may be improper 
because its effect is to exclude people (such as low and moderate 
income groups) entirely from the municipality, or because the se-
verity of its restrictive impact on the owner of the regulated prop-
erty is unjustified for police power purposes .... 
299. 502 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. 1985). 
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proof is on the municipality "to establish that the prohibition pro-
motes public health, safety, morals and general welfare."300 Finding 
that the township had failed to provide evidence of how it was accom-
modating its "fair share" of affordable housing and had likewise failed 
to establish that the total exclusion served a legitimate public purpose, 
the court held the zoning ordinance to be unconstitutional. 301 
iii. New Hampshire 
In Britton v. Town of Chester, "a group of low- and moderate-income 
people who [had] been unsuccessful in finding affordable, adequate 
housing in the town, and a builder who ... [was] committed to the 
construction of such housing," brought an action against the town for 
alleged exclusionary zoning practices.302 The zoning ordinance at is-
sue allowed multi-family housing only as part of planned residential 
developments, which in turn were only allowed on approximately 
1. 73% of the land in the town. 303 In its reasoning, the court stated 
that "[t]he town of Chester appears willing to lower [the drawbridge] 
only for people who can afford a single-family home on a two-acre lot 
or a duplex on a three-acre lot" and that "[0] thers are realistically 
prohibited from crossing."304 The court found that the enabling legis-
lation allowed the town to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance "for 
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, or the general welfare of the 
community" and that the general welfare provision should be inter-
preted to include the welfare of the broader "community," of which 
the municipality is only a part.305 The court, therefore, concluded 
that because the Chester Zoning Ordinance did not provide for the 
lawful needs of the community to provide affordable housing, it 
"[flew] in the face" of the general welfare provision of the enabling 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 588. See also C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Zoning Hearing 
Bd., 820 A.2d 143, 157-58 (Pa. 2002) (invalidating a one-acre minimum lot 
size requirement, coupled with other restrictions, as promoting an "exclu-
sionary purpose" and having no "substantial relationship to the Township'S 
interest in preserving its agricultural lands and activities or any other gen-
eral welfare interest of the Township"). 
302. 595 A.2d 492, 493 (N.H. 1991). 
303. Id. at 494. 
304. Id. at 495. 
305. Id. In some respects, the provisions of the New Hampshire planning and 
zoning enabling act are similar to Maryland's parallel provisions in Article 
66B of the Maryland Code. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 1.00(h) 1, 2, 
3.05, 4.10(b), 4.03, 4.05(a), 10.01, 12.01 (Supp.2002). For example, Sec-
tion 10.01 expressly provides that "[t]o encourage the ... provision of af-
fordable housing and to facilitate orderly development and growth," a local 
government "is encouraged to enact [provisions] providing for or requir-
ing" planned unit developments. Id. § 10.01 (a). Further, the authority 
provided in section 10.01 is expressly "not intended to limit a localjurisdic-
tion's authority to ... [p] rovide affordable housing." Id. § 10.01 (c) (2) (iii). 
But see infra note 355 and accompanying text. 
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legislation and, thus, was an invalid exercise of the power delegated to 
the town.306 
IX. LITIGATION OPTIONS 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, several options exist for a plain-
tiff who desires to mount a judicial challenge to the exclusionary zon-
ing regulations of a Maryland local government. Those options 
include the following: 
• File a Fourteenth Amendment challenge in federal court for 
violations of due process and equal protection under the U.S. 
Constitution, premised upon the local government's failure to 
make reasonable housing opportunities available to all catego-
ries of citizens, including those of low and moderate income; 
• File suit in federal court for violation of the federal FHA, for 
failure to make housing available "because of race, color, relig-
ion, sex, familial status, national origin [or physical 
handicap]";307 
• File an "as applied" challenge in a Maryland court for violation 
of equal protection and due process under the Maryland Con-
stitution (including a "Mount Laurel' challenge), based upon 
the denial by the local government of a permit or other devel-
opment approval for a specific affordable housing project; and 
• File a broad-based "Mount Laurel' challenge in a Maryland 
court for violation of equal protection and due process rights 
under the Maryland Constitution, premised upon the local gov-
ernment's failure to make reasonable housing opportunities 
available to all categories of citizens, including those of low or 
moderate income. 
Each of these options is discussed in turn. 
A. Federal Court Challenge Under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
For the reasons previously discussed in Part VlII.B, mounting a fed-
eral equal protection or due process challenge in federal court does 
not appear to be a viable option. The Supreme Court's reluctance to 
even entertain such suits,308 let alone uphold them on the merits,309 is 
well known. The requirement that the plaintiff must prove a govern-
mental intent to discriminate on racial grounds to violate an equal 
protection claim virtually eliminates any chance of succeeding.310 
306. Britton, 595 A.2d at 496. 
307. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2003). FHA suits may also be filed in state courts. Id. 
§§ 3610(f), 3613(a) (I)(A). 
308. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See also supra Part VIII.B.l.i. 
309. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See also supra Part VIII.B.2.i. 
310. See supra Part VIII.B.2.ii. 
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"[C]lever men may easily conceal their motivations."311 Further, the 
Supreme Court has yet to recognize housing as a fundamental 
right.312 
Although not directly germane, the Court's apparent lack of con-
cern for the equal protection or due process rights of prospective re-
sidents of proposed affordable housing facilities that are petitioned to 
referendum313 does not inspire confidence that the time is ripe for 
another Village of Belle Terre type of challenge. Of the four options for 
legal challenge to exclusionary zoning, this one is the least attractive. 
B. An FHA Challenge 
The FHA offers the best chance of succeeding in a federal court. As 
previously noted, however, suits under the FHA are generally "as ap-
plied" in nature, in that they usually involve the denial of, or failure to 
take action on, a specific housing development proposa1.314 The FHA 
only applies to those individuals who are part of a protected class and 
does not cover those who are denied access to housing based solely 
upon their economic statuS.315 FHA lawsuits, therefore, are not ap-
propriate in all instances where individuals are denied housing due to 
their income. 
To have standing in an FHA action, the plaintiff must show that she 
has sustained an "injury in fact" -such as being denied housing due 
to the plaintiff's race or religion-and that it is likely that the court 
can provide redress for the i~ury.316 Thus, in a situation where a Ma-
ryland local government is alleged to have violated the FHA, eligible 
plaintiffs might include citizens belonging to an FHA protected class 
who were denied access to housing because of the local government's 
disapproval of a zoning, subdivision or building permit for an apart-
ment building in which the plaintiff sought to live. A builder denied 
such approval might also have standing if he were a member of an 
FHA protected class. 
Also, as noted above, in FHA actions, as distinguished from equal 
protection suits under the Fourteenth Amendment, an effect test-as 
opposed to an intent test-would be used to determine whether the 
311. Huntington Branch NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 
1988) (quoting Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
312. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 7; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). See 
also supra Part VIII.B.2.i .. 
313. See supra Part VIII.B.3 (discussing the "Referendum Cases": City of Cuyahoga 
Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003) and City of Eastlake v. 
Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976». 
314. See HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 143. 
315. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2003) (extending the protections of the FHA only to 
victims of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, fa-
milial status, or national origin). 
316. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 220, at 512. 
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local government's actions with regard to housing unavailability have 
had a disparate impact, for example, upon persons of a particular race 
or religion.317 Thus, if qualified plaintiffs are located, then an FHA 
action may be effective. Again, however, such an action is unlikely to 
remedy the pervasive problem of exclusionary zoning based upon in-
come or economic status. The FHA option, therefore, has limitations. 
1. Section 1983 Challenge 
An FHA challenge could also be accompanied by a claim under 
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for violation of the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 
1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or any other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [fed-
eral] laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, 
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer 
for an action or omission taken in such officer's judicial ca-
pacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declara-
tory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applica-
ble exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be consid-
ered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.3ls 
A local government is deemed to be a "person" within the meaning 
of § 1983 and, therefore, can be sued under that statute.319 In exercis-
ing its planning and zoning functions pursuant to Article 66B or Arti-
cle 25A of the Maryland Annotated Code, a local government is acting 
under color of state law and, thus, is clearly a "person" within the 
meaning of § 1983. Furthermore, local governments are not entitled 
to qualified good faith immunity in § 1983 actions, even when they act 
reasonably under the circumstances and without knowledge of any 
wrongdoing. 320 
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment may impose § 1983 liability on the governmental agency respon-
sible.32I The Equal Protection Clause is violated if the actions taken 
317. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
318. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2003). 
319. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 658-59 (1978). 
320. See Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). 
321. See, e.g., Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (stating that "the 
purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to 
secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and 
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by a local government are irrational and arbitrarily discriminatory.322 
Similarly, violations of one's substantive due process rights are action-
able under § 1983. One seeking approval of a workforce-housing de-
velopment arguably has a "right to be free of arbitrary or irrational 
zoning actions."323 Bias, bad faith, or improper motives on the part of 
the local government may violate substantive due process rights.324 
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal district courts to 
hear and decide § 1983 actions.325 The prevailing party in a § 1983 
action may also recover Attorney's fees. 326 
C. An "As Applied" Challenge to a Denial of a Site Specific Housing Appli-
cation in a Maryland Court 
An "as applied" challenge might include both due process and 
equal protection claims arising under the Maryland Constitution, with 
or without a Mount Laurel claim of discrimination based upon income 
or economic status. As further discussed in Part IX.D.3, one filing an 
"as applied" challenge based upon the local government's denial of a 
development application for an affordable housing facility must be 
concerned about requirements in state or local law for "exhaustion of 
administrative remedies."327 This requirement means that an appeal 
of an agency action must first be heard, usually on the record, by an 
administrative-lay board, such as the local board of appeals.328 Only 
then may the appellant proceed to court. With the exception of zon-
ing amendment decisions of the local governing body, exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is often required in counties which derive 
their zoning enabling authority from Article 66B or Article 25A of the 
Maryland Annotated Code.329 Thus, for example, in most counties a 
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute 
or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents") (citations 
omitted). 
322. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) 
(citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973». 
323. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) 
(citations omitted). 
324. See Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. Phila., 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991). 
325. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) (citations omitted). See also Mears 
v. Oxford, 762 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that "a Maryland state 
court has jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims") (citations omitted). 
326. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). See also N.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. 
Council, 479 U.S. 6, 12 (1986); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 
(1983); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 
1994). 
327. See discussion infra Part IX.D.3.i. 
328. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.07(d) (2003); see also Wharf at Handy's 
Point, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 92 Md. App. 659, 669, 610 A.2d 314, 
318-19 (1992) (citation omitted). 
329. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.07(d) (2003); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, 
§ 5(U) (2001). Montgomery and Prince George's Counties derive their 
planning and zoning power from Article 28 of the Maryland Code. See MD. 
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county planning commission's decision on a subdivision or site plan 
application for residential development is subject to appeal to a 
county board of appeals before one may proceed to court. 
Once in court, the appeal is still on the record. 330 The court is not 
an independent trier of fact in these cases, and will disturb the agency 
decision only if there is an error of law, or if the decision is not sup-
ported by substantial evidence.331 The latter is a very deferential test, 
as Maryland courts have interpreted "substantial evidence" to mean 
merely "more than a scintilla."332 This is especially true when a legisla-
tive decision is involved. Moreover, boards of appeal are not appro-
priate forums in which to litigate constitutional claims, since only 
courts are empowered to decide constitutional questions or questions 
of law. Finally, the time required to pursue an appeal on the record 
can be lengthy, requiring several years in some cases, especially if an 
appeal is pursued all the way to Maryland's highest court. For all of 
these reasons, filing an on the record administrative appeal to resolve 
a constitutional issue is not recommended, but may nevertheless be 
necessary. 
On the other hand, as set forth in Part IX.D.3, the exhaustion re-
quirement is not always an absolute bar to gaining immediate court 
access.333 If no administrative remedy exists or if the administrative 
remedy is inadequate, an "as applied" challenge can proceed directly 
to court334 through a declaratory judgment suit and/or an action for 
injunctive relief. 
D. A Mount Laurel Challenge in Maryland 
1. Comparing the Constitutions of Maryland and New Jersey 
The relevant constitutional provisions of New Jersey and Maryland 
are similar, although not identical. Specifically, Article I, Paragraph 1 
of the New Jersey Constitution provides that "[a]ll persons are by na-
ture free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable 
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and lib-
erty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursu-
ANN. CODE art. 28, § 3-101 (2003). Since their planning agency-the Mary-
land National Capital Park and Planning Commission (M-NCPPC)-is a bi-
county regional agency, its decisions on, e.g., applications for subdivision or 
site plan approval, are not subject to review by either county's board of 
appeals. 
330. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Prince George's County v. Oak Hill Farms, 
Inc., 232 Md. 274, 277, 192 A.2d 761, 763 (1963). 
331. See id. 
332. See id. at 280, 192 A.2d at 764; Anne Arundel County v. A-PAC Ltd., 67 Md. 
App. 122, 126,506 A.2d 671, 673 (1986). 
333. See discussion infra Part IX.D.3.ii. 
334. As discussed in Part IX.D.3.i, a facial challenge to an exclusionary zoning 
scheme would not be subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement. 
204 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
ing and obtaining safety and happiness."335 Article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights provides "[t]hat no man ought to be 
taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privi-
leges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or de-
prived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, 
or by the Law of the land."336 
While the Maryland Constitution, like the New Jersey Constitution, 
does not contain an express equal protection clause,337 the concept of 
equal protection has been held to be embodied in Article 24.338 
Courts have also held that equal protection under Article 24 applies 
"in like manner and to the same extent as" the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.339 Further research is needed 
to determine whether and to what extent a Maryland court would be 
inclined to afford greater protection to a plaintiff excluded from af-
fordable housing on economic grounds due to a county's zoning reg-
ulations than was afforded by the United States Constitution as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Belle Terre. 
2. Standing Requirements in Maryland 
t. Assumed Fact~40 
A development company (the "Developer") is interested in chal-
lenging the exclusionary zoning practices of a Maryland County (the 
"County"), which result in the exclusion of people of low and moder-
ate income from the County due to the lack of affordable housing. 
The Developer mayor may not join as plaintiffs with a builders' associ-
ation, an affordable housing advocacy association, and individual citi-
zens who have been unable to move into the County due to these 







NJ. CaNST. art. I, 11 l. 
MD. CaNST. art. 24. A.J;, noted, the constitutions of several states-including 
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin-use 
language nearly identical to that in the New Jersey Constitution in describ-
ing equal protection and due process rights. See supra note 16 and accom-
panying text. 
Article I of the New Jersey Constitution is similar regarding this omission. 
See NJ. CaNST. art. I. 
See, e.g., Frankel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Md. Sys., 361 Md. 298, 312-13, 
761 A.2d 324, 332 (2000); Maryland v. Good Samaritan Hosp., Inc., 299 
Md. 310, 327 n.7, 473 A.2d 892, 900 n.7 (1984) (citation omitted). 
See e.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 354, 601 A.2d 102, 108 (1992) 
(citing Att'y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704-05, 426 A.2d 929, 941 
(1981)). See also Morrow v. Farrell, 187 F. Supp. 2d 548,556 (D. Md. 2002) 
(stating that Article 24 applies "in like manner" as the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) (citation omitted). 
Additional facts and specifics would need to be alleged in describing the 
actions or inactions of the County, the effect of such action or inaction 
upon the Developer, and how such action or inaction may result in further-
ing an exclusionary scheme. 
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on the denial of a particular application, but could also be founded 
upon a history or pattern of discriminatory actions taken by the 
County under its planning and zoning regulations. 
ii. Questions Presented 
(1) Does the Developer have standing to challenge the exclusion-
ary zoning practices in the County? Would a builders' association or 
people who cannot afford housing in the County have standing? 
(2) Could a declaratory judgment action be brought immediately 
to challenge the County's practices or must an actual development 
application first be filed and denied? 
iii. Short Answers 
(l) While a good argument can be made that the Developer and 
citizens directly affected by the County's practices have standing to 
challenge the County's practices, the standing of the builders' associa-
tion and affordable housing associations might be problematic. 
(2) It appears that a declaratory judgment action could be brought 
directly, without the need to file a specific application on which the 
County must act. 
• It might be prudent, however, to also initiate an "as applied" 
challenge by a prospective builder/developer who has filed 
for and been denied a building permit or other development 
request for affordable housing, or by a prospective home 
purchaser who has been unable to find affordable housing in 
the County. 
tv. Discussion 
When Maryland courts consider whether a party has standing to 
challenge a particular ordinance or action, they generally look to 
whether a plaintiff has suffered special harm or injury, over and above 
the impact of the proposed use upon the public generally.341 Such 
adverse effect must be specifically alleged by the plaintiff and sup-
ported by facts. For example, in Citizens Committee of Anne Arundel 
County v. County Commissioners of Anne Arundel County, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that a group of taxpayers did not have stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute where "they ... failed 
to prove or show any special damage or loss which is peculiar to them-
selves as taxpayers or otherwise."342 
341. See, e.g., Sugarloaf Citizens' Assn. v. Dep't of Env't, 344 Md. 271, 288, 686 
A.2d 605, 614 (1996); Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 247 
Md. 137, 144, 230 A.2d 289, 294 (1967). An applicant for a development 
permit that is denied would almost certainly have standing under Mary-
land's aggrievement standards. 
342. 233 Md. 398,400, 197 A.2d 108, 109 (1964). 
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Maryland courts, however, appear to be receptive to the argument 
that "peculiar effect" may include an adverse economic impact upon a 
specific group of people. In Bruce v. Director, Department of Chesapeake 
Bay Affairs,343 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the stand-
ing of fishermen to challenge statutes restricting the taking and catch-
ing of crabs and oysters in Maryland.344 When examining the issue of 
standing, the court recognized the general principle that "if a person 
is directly affected by a statute, there is no reason why he should not 
be permitted to obtain a judicial declaration that the statute is uncon-
stitutional."345 The court held that the fishermen had standing be-
cause the restrictions in the statutes at issue had a severe adverse 
economic effect on the fishermen.346 
It should be noted that federal courts in the Fourth Circuit also 
appear willing to consider anticipated adverse effects, as well as actual 
effects, when determining standing. For example, in Kirkley v. Mary-
land,347 a declaratory judgment action was brought asserting the inva-
lidity of a state election statute; the plaintiffs were a candidate for 
office and a registered voter, respectively, who had planned to vote for 
that candidate.348 Although the defendants in this case did not di-
rectly raise the issue of standing, the district court noted that as to 
both plaintiffs, including the plaintiff who had merely expressed her 
intention to vote in a certain manner, there was "a logical nexus be-
tween the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated."349 
Based on the foregoing, it could be argued that the Developer has 
standing because it has suffered, and will continue to suffer, adverse 
economic effects. These effects are due to the exclusionary zoning 
practices of the County because the Developer cannot obtain develop-
ment approvals needed to build moderately priced dwellings. The 
Developer might further support its standing argument by asserting 
that, while no specific applications have been denied by the County, it 
is the intent and commitment of the Developer to build such units in 
the County, and that based upon the County's past actions or non-
actions, it is unlikely that permits authorizing such construction will 
be approved. Likewise, individual plaintiffs who cannot live in the 








261 Md. 588, 276 A.2d 200 (1971). 
Id. at 594, 276 A.2d at 205. 
Id. at 595, 276 A.2d at 205 (citing Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 389, 37 A.2d 
880,883 (1944». 
Id. at 595, 276 A.2d at 206. 
381 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 1974). 
See id. at 328. 
Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968». It should be noted, 
however, that the court further stated that the voter's stake in the case was 
her fundamental right to vote, because if Kirkley's candidacy were declared 
illegal after the election, she would be denied her vote. Id. at 329. The 
Supreme Court does not yet consider the right to housing to be a funda-
mental right. See discussion supra Part VIII.B.2.i. 
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have tried to find such housing therein and have been particularly 
affected by their exclusion from the County. The builders' association 
and housing advocacy groups, on the other hand, would be less likely 
to be granted standing in a Maryland court. Although standing was 
granted to such groups in Mount Laurel I and II, in similar cases in 
Maryland and other jurisdictions, general associations usually have 
been found to lack standing.350 
Such arguments in favor of standing would be further strengthened 
by arguing that public policy favors a finding of standing in this case. 
Maryland courts have recognized that the requirements for standing 
may be somewhat relaxed where the action involves a matter of great 
public concern. Although choosing not to apply this principle in the 
case before it, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Citizens Committee of 
Anne Arundel County'-'.51 recognized prior cases of the court stating that 
"in exceptional cases, where great principles or large public interests 
are involved, citizens or corporations may sue on behalf of themselves, 
and their fellow-citizens to arrest some projected violation of constitu-
tionallaw or abuse of corporate authority."352 This same principle was 
stated more forcefully in the later case of City of Baltimore v. Concord 
Baptist Church.353 Concord Baptist Church involved a challenge to a stat-
ute concerning the condemnation of churches, and the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that "where the issues presented are of great 
public interest and concern, the interest necessary to sustain standing 
need only be slight."354 
The need to provide housing opportunities for people of all in-
comes in developing areas of the state should be a matter of great 
public concern in Maryland. As noted above, article 66B, section 
10.01 of the Annotated Code of Maryland expressly "encourages" lo-
cal governments to "provide affordable housing" by way of "planned 







See, e.g., Horace Mann League, Inc. v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 652, 
220 A.2d 51, 54 (1966) (holding that the Horace Mann League lacked 
standing to sue on behalf of its individual members or the public as a 
whole); Citizens Comm. of Anne Arundel County v. County Comm'rs of 
Anne Arundel County, 233 Md. 398,405, 197 A.2d 108, 112 (1964) (hold-
ing that the citizens committee was without standing to sue on behalf of its 
members). 
233 Md. 398, 197 A.2d 108 (1964). 
Id. at 402,197 A.2d at 110 (citing Kelly Piet & Co. v. Baltimore, 53 Md. 134, 
139 (1880)) (correction omitted). 
257 Md. 132,262 A.2d 755 (1970). 
Id. at 138, 262 A.2d at 759. See also Raraee Mann League, Inc., 242 Md. at 
653, 220 A.2d at 54 (involving the funding of private colleges and holding 
that where the issues presented are of great public interest and concern, 
"the necessary interest to sustain standing to institute a taxpayer's suit is 
'broadly comprehensive' and may be 'slight'''). 
See supra note 305. Incredibly, however, Article 66B, Section 1.01, entitled 
"Visions," makes no reference to housing, much less to the need to provide 
"affordable" housing for the workforce. See supra note 161. Section 1.03, 
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albeit dealing with access to public accommodations, clearly reflects 
Maryland's emphasis on affordable housing. It states: 
It is the policy of the State of Maryland to provide for fair 
housing throughout the State of Maryland, to all its citizens 
... and to that end to prohibit discriminatory practices with 
respect to residential housing by any person or group of per-
sons, in order that the peace, health, safety, prosperity and 
general welfare of all the inhabitants of the State may be pro-
tected and insured.356 
A similar finding of great public concern was made in Mount Laurel 
1,357 where the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted "an extreme, long-
time need in this state for decent low and moderate income housing, 
set forth in the numerous statutes providing for various agencies and 
methods at both state and local levels designed to aid in alleviation of 
the need."358 The court concluded that "[ilt is plain beyond dispute 
that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories of people 
is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of general welfare re-
quired in all local land use regulation."359 
3. Requirements for a Declaratory Judgment Action 
"The Maryland Declaratory Judgments Act ... is remedial in nature 
and 'its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and 
insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.' "360 
To this end, Maryland courts have repeatedly held that "[tlhe Act 
shall be liberally construed and administered."361 The courts have 
further noted that" [a] primary objective of the Act is to 'relieve liti-
gants of the rule of the common law that no declaration of rights may 
be judicially adjudged unless a right has been violated.' "362 
dealing with Comprehensive Plans in Charter Counties, does not include 
housing among the "Required Elements" of the comprehensive plan. MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1.03 (2003). Similarly, Section 3.05, entitled "The 
Plan," does not include housing among the mandated elements of a plan, 
but merely authorizes inclusion of a housing element among discretionary 
elements that may be listed therein. See supra note 162. 
356. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(a) (2003). 
357. 336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975). 
358. Id. at 727. 
359. Id. 
360. County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County v. Days Cove Reclamation Co., 
122 Md. App. 505, 516, 713 A.2d 351, 356 (1998) (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-402 (2002». 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 517, 713 A.2d at 357 (quoting Boyds Civic Ass'n. v. Montgomery 
County Council, 309 Md. 683, 691, 526 A.2d 598, 602 (1987). 
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z. The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Issue 
Regardless of the liberal application the Declaratory Judgments Act 
may afford, declaratory judgment actions may not lie where a party 
has not exhausted its administrative remedies or where the issue is not 
ripe for review. Pursuant to the Maryland Code, when a statute pro-
vides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory 
remedy must be followed in lieu of a declaratory judgment action.363 
Exhaustion is often required in land use cases. For example, Article 
66B of the Maryland Code expressly grants to county boards of appeal 
the power to "[h] ear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is 
error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by 
an administrative officer in the enforcement of this article or of any 
ordinance adopted under this article."364 Further, "[i] t is well estab-
lished that [where] an appeal from the action of an administrative 
body is provided by statute, a remedy by way of mandamus, injunction 
or declaratory judgment will be denied."365 
However, the prohibition against awarding declaratory relief to par-
ties who have alternative statutory administrative remedies "is applica-
ble only where the alternative means of redress was intended to be 
exclusive."366 The Maryland Court of Appeals explained the rationale 
behind the exhaustion doctrine in Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 
where it stated: 
The principal reasons for this exhaustion requirement with 
respect to administrative bodies are manifest-(i) the issues 
are largely within the expertise of the involved agency to 
hear the evidence and determine the propriety of the re-
quest; (ii) the courts would be undertaking functions the leg-
islature thought could best be performed by an agency; and 
(iii) courts might be called upon to decide matters that 
would never arise if the prescribed administrative remedy 
was followed.367 
Maryland courts have recognized that exhaustion is not an "abso-
lute" bar to access to the courts. Limited exceptions exist that allow a 
party to pursue declaratory relief even without exhausting administra-
tive remedies. These exceptions "include: (1) when the party attacks 






See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-409 (2002). 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.07(d)(1) (2002). See also Wharf at Handy's 
Point, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 92 Md. App. 659, 669, 610 A.2d 314, 
318-19 (1992). 
Bd. of County Comm'rs. v. Buch, 190 Md. 394, 402, 58 A.2d 672, 676 
(1948). 
Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm. v. Wash. Nat. Arena, 282 Md. 
588,595,386 A.2d 1216, 1223 (1978). 
288 Md. 275, 284, 418 A.2d 1155, 1160-61 (1980). 
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administrative remedy; or (3) when the administrative remedy pro-
vided by the statutory scheme is inadequate."368 
Therefore, there are a number of approaches that may be taken in 
addressing the issue of exhaustion of remedies in this type of case. 
The first is, of course, that there is no statutory requirement, much 
less an exclusive one, requiring a person to file an application and 
have it denied before pursuing a declaratory judgment action, al-
though such an exclusive statutory remedy may arguably exist in the 
County's code for appeals from denials of specific applications. Sec-
ond, even if such a requirement arguably exists, it would have to be 
shown that it was intended to be an exclusive remedy. Finally, if it 
were found that such an exclusive remedy existed, the exceptions 
from the exhaustion doctrine could be argued, as the Developer's ac-
tion here would be a facial challenge and the administrative remedy 
would be inadequate (in that the challenge itself is to the County's 
discriminatory practices and, therefore, challenges to such practices 
could not possibly be reviewed objectively by the County). 
Zl. Ripeness 
With regard to the related issue of ripeness, Maryland courts have 
been liberal in their interpretation of what issues are ripe for review in 
declaratory judgment actions. In Boyds Civic Association v. Montgomery 
County Council,369 the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that "if a 
court is satisfied that the 'ripening seeds' of an actual controversy ex-
ist, the facts are not too contingent or speculative for declaratory re-
lief."370 For example, in Key Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Anne 
Arundel County,371 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
declaratory relief was proper when a property owner brought an ac-
tion against the county with respect to the county's threatened with-
holding of occupancy permits.372 Likewise, in Liss v. Goodman,373 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland considered ripe the question of 
whether the City Council had authority to reject proposed budgets 
submitted to it by the Board of Estimates even when the Board of 
Estimates had not yet submitted the annual budget and there was no 
certainty the City Council would want to reject it.374 
368. See Abington Ctr. Assocs. v. Baltimore County, 115 Md. App. 580, 593, 694 
A.2d 165, 171 (1997) (citations omitted). 
369. 309 Md. 683, 526 A.2d 598 (1987). 
370. [d. at 691, 526 A.2d at 602. 
371. 54 Md. App. 633, 460 A.2d 86 (1983). 
372. [d. at 642, 460 A.2d at 91-92 (emphasis added). 
373. 224 Md. 173, 167 A.2d 123 (1960). 
374. [d. at 180, 167 A.2d at 126-27. 
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4. Are Maryland Courts Up To the Task? 
z. Applicable Factors for Successful Court Intervention 
If a Mount Laurel strategy were to be attempted in Maryland, the 
issues encountered in implementing the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey's Mount Laurel I and subsequent Mount Laurel decisions must be 
taken into account, along with the capacity of a Maryland court to 
address them. Admittedly, there will be questions about the capacity 
of a Maryland court, or indeed any court, to effectively manage litiga-
tion of the magnitude of Mount Laurel. Several years before Mount 
Laurel, one scholar observed that the success of such a fundamental 
decision dealing with equal protection depends upon the presence of 
two of three factors ("Kurland Factors"): 
• "that the constitutional standard is a simple one; 
• that the courts have adequate control over the means of effec-
tuating enforcement; and 
• that the public acquiesces in the principle and its 
application. "375 
It must be acknowledged that problems were encountered in imple-
menting Mount Laurell For nearly a decade thereafter, municipali-
ties, home-builders, lawyers, courts, and many citizens became bogged 
down over such questions as: 
(i) What is a developing county? 
(ii) What is the relevant region, perhaps the county itself or the 
county plus neighboring counties? 
(iii) What is meant by "realistic opportunity?" 
(iv) What is "affordable" or "workforce" housing? 
(v) What is a community's reasonable fair share? 
Resolution of these issues was not easy and there was a great deal of 
frustration which ultimately led to Mount Laurel Il 376 Even to this day, 
for example, respected commentators have questioned the wisdom of 
imposing standards for determining what is a municipality's "regional 
fair share" of affordable housing opportunities.377 
There is strong reason, however, to believe that the requisite two of 
the three Kurland Factors-i.e., the first two factors-could be satis-
fied if a Maryland court were to undertake and decide a Mount Laurel 
suit. To begin with, the basic entity of local governance in Maryland, 




HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 137 (citing Philip B. 
Kurland, Equal Education Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional jurisprudence 
Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 583, 592 (1968)) (bullets added). 
See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, The Affordable Housing Element In Comprehen-
sive Plans, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFT. L. REv. 555 (2003) (arguing that the assign-
ment of numerical fair shares is not an acceptable basis for affordable 
housing policies in comprehensive plans, and that alternate strategies 
should be considered). 
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ing power is vested in only twenty-three counties, the City of Baltimore 
and a relatively small number of municipalities. In contrast, New 
Jersey spreads the planning and zoning among many small towns, 
townships and other municipalities, each of whose landmass is sub-
stantially less than the hundreds of square miles comprising the typi-
cal Maryland county. Thus, "regions" in Maryland should be more 
readily ascertainable, and consequently, determining a county's fair 
share of the region's affordable housing needs should not be as 
difficult. 
One consideration abetting this calculus could be enactment of 
state legislation mandating the maintenance of buildable land inven-
tories by local governments, as strongly recommended in APA's re-
cently published Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook.378 Inventories of 
this nature would greatly assist the State of Maryland, its local govern-
ments and, if necessary, its courts in determining whether, for exam-
ple, the supply of workforce housing in a given county or region is 
keeping pace with the growth of employment therein. Fair share 
housing goals could be based on standards or guidelines arising from 
these inventories and related analyses, and could be set forth either as 
empirical standards required to be achieved, or as recommended opti-
mal ranges, which if not achieved over a period of time would warrant 
remedial actions by the local government on a voluntary basis, with 
mandates being deferred. 
Moreover, while Maryland, unlike New Jersey, does not have a State 
Development Guide Plan (which was adopted in New Jersey after 
Mount Laurel 1), it does have in place a "smart growth" program, re-
flected in a series of laws intended, among other things, to channel 
growth into designated "Priority Funding Areas" (PFAs).379 Thus, a 
regional approach to planning is already in place and being enhanced 
in Maryland. 
ii. Applying the Kurland Factors to a Maryland Mount Laurel Case 
The aforementioned circumstances argue well for a Maryland 
"Mount Laurel" court being able to achieve the first two of the three 
Kurland Factors, were it to rule in favor of the plaintiffs. As noted 
above, the first factor is that "the constitutional standard be a simple 




AM. PlANNING AsS'N, 1 GROWING SMART LEGISlATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL 
STATUTES FOR PlANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 7-94 to 95 (Stu-
art Meck ed., 2002). To date, the Maryland Association of Counties has not 
embraced legislative proposals that would require mandatory lot invento-
ries in Maryland. 
State funding of public infrastructure, including roads, is to be prioritized 
based upon whether a project is located in a designated PFA. See HOUSING 
FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 137. 
See id. 
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contemplated the definition of "region" and methodologies for deter-
mining "fair share," both of which were considerably more difficult to 
discern in New Jersey than they would be in Maryland. The Commis-
sion, however, had no difficulty in concluding that Mount Laurel I sat-
isfied "the first two" of the Kurland Factors.381 As to the first factor, 
the Commission stated that: "The basic standard is that presumptively 
a municipality cannot foreclose the opportunity for low- and moder-
ate-income housing, and in its regulations it must affirmatively afford 
that opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share 
of the present and prospective regional need for such housing."382 
Although, as noted, the Commission found some definitions and 
criteria to be open to debate, it concluded that "the standard is ame-
nable to quantification and thus is in some respects analogous to the 
simple one-man-one-vote standard of the reapportionment cases."383 
Nor, said the Commission, is a judicial standard that contemplates "a 
relatively even distribution of low - and moderate-income housing 
throughout a region ... irrational."384 
With regard to the second of the Kurland Factors, that the court 
have adequate control over the means of effectuating enforcement,385 
the Commission acknowledged that while considerable doubt had 
been expressed about the availability of effective remedies "to enforce 
the outcome of a Mount Laure~type of suit,"386 it noted that the court 
in Mount Laurel I called upon the state legislature to enact some form 
of regional zoning.387 The Commission concluded that effective rem-
edies could be fashioned by the courts and thus help facilitate "funda-
mental changes in metropolitan housing patterns."388 Some of these 
remedies, including greater reliance upon builders' remedies and var-
iances, were incorporated in Mount Laurel IL389 
As in New Jersey, a Maryland court could call upon state agencies 
and associations, such as the Maryland Department of Planning and 
the Maryland Association of Counties, to assist it in promulgating 
guidelines to answer questions such as those posed in Mount Laurel. 390 











See HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 137-38. 
Id. at 137. 
Id. at 138. 
Id. 
Id. at 137. 
Id. 
Id. at 138. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 (2001) (acknowledging the re-
gional planning mandate of the Supreme Court of New Jersey as expressed 
in Mt. Laurel I and II). The New Jersey legislature subsequently authorized 
the creation of the Council on Affordable Housing. See Toll Bros. v. West 
Windsor Township, 803 A.2d 53 (NJ. 2002). 
HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 138-39. 
See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 452-60 (discussing remedies available in Mount 
Laurel litigation) . 
See supra Part VlII.C.2.i.a. 
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could not be fashioned by a Maryland court, since some of these "rem-
edies" (i.e., regional local governance) are either in place or readily 
achievable in Maryland. 
While the Commission was ambivalent about the "broader ques-
tion" of outright judicial intervention in combating the exclusion of 
low- and moderate-income housing from the suburbs, it acknowl-
edged that courts "have an important role to play" in this regard.391 
Nonetheless, the Commission felt that broader intervention by the 
courts would be "premature."392 
Suffice to say that twenty-five years have passed since the Commis-
sion made these observations, and the exclusion of the workforce 
from housing opportunities near places of employment has become 
more pronounced in Maryland than ever before. It has reached a 
point where the economic well being of the state, or at least a signifi-
cant number of its regions, may be imperiled.393 The complexities of 
effectively enforcing a favorable Mount Laurel ruling in Maryland, 
while formidable, are demonstrably less than those that confronted 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1975. That court, unlike a Mary-
land court considering such a case today, had no meaningful judicial 
precedent to draw upon.394 A Maryland court would not only have 
the Mount Laurel litigation (and implementation) experiences to 
guide it, but as noted, it would have an additional quarter-century of 
local government intransigence and federal court indifference to re-
flect upon. Finally, as noted, Maryland's primary system of local gov-
ernance through its counties would likely narrow some of the issues 
before a state court and facilitate enforcement of its remedial orders. 
Thus, the Mount Laurel option, though by no means a simple one, 
has significant potential as a vehicle for addressing broad-based exclu-
sion of citizens from housing opportunities in Maryland because of 
their income. It warrants further research and consideration. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Two decades ago, in a widely discussed essay, entitled The Egre-
gious Invalidity of the Exclusive Single Family Zone, the late Richard 
F. Babcock, the dean of America land use attorneys, concluded his 
clarion call by saying: 
Today, there can be no justification under the police 
power for compelling the construction of single-family 
houses. The daring trial lawyer who chooses to litigate this 
issue will undoubtedly lose in the trial and intermediate 
391. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER THE LAw, supra note 159, at 139. 
392. Id. 
393. See, e.g., GMU Analysis, infra Appendix. 
394. See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 409-lO (noting that Mt. Laurel I was a case of 
first impression). 
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courts. But he should prepare his record with the Supreme 
Court view. Using as witnesses builders, demographers, engi-
neers, planners, environmentalists, and land economists, he 
should build a record that once and for all demolishes the 
notion that the single-family detached house is forever iso-
lated and protected.395 
To this we would add only one qualification, namely that when chal-
lenging land use regulations that exclude people based on their in-
come, the challengers should also focus upon their State constitution 
and State high court. For, as the late Justice William Brennan ob-
served over a quarter-century ago: 
[T] he point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot 
rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protec-
tions of the federal Constitution. State Constitutions, too, are a 
font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond 
those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. 
The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the 
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protec-
tive force of state law-for without it, the full realization of 
out liberties cannot be guaranteed.396 
[S] tate courts that rest their decisions wholly or even partly 
on state law need not apply federal principles of standing 
and justiciability that deny litigants access to the courts. 
Moreover, the state decisions not only cannot be overturned 
by, they indeed are not even reveiwable by, the Supreme 
Court of the United States. We are utterly without jurisdic-
tion to review such state decisions. This was precisely the cir-
cumstance of Mr. Justice Hall's now famous Mt. Laurel decision, 
which was grounded on the New Jersey Constitution and on state 
law. The review sought in that case in the United States Supreme 
Court was, therefore, completely precluded. 397 
For those who are concerned that local land use regulations may be 
denying reasonable housing opportunities to citizens, based upon 
their income, the time may well have come (after more than a quarter 
century) to reexamine the initiatives of New Jersey Justice Frederick 
Hall in Mount Laurel I and the advice of Supreme Court Justice Wil-
liam Brennan, as noted above. 
395. Richard F. Babcock, The ~gregious Invalidity of The Exclusive Single-Family 
Zone, 35 LAND USE L. AND ZONING DIG. 4, 8 (1983). 
396. Brennan, supra note 266, at 491 (emphasis added). 
397. Id. at 502 (emphasis added). 
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This research effort by The Center for Regional Analysis at George 
Mason University was undertaken in response to concerns that a con-
strained supply and diminished affordability of housing could further 
threaten the economic growth and vitality of the Greater Washington 
region. The research examines past and current trends and projected 
future demand and supply of the region's housing. 
The purpose of the research was to analyze regional trends in hous-
ing demand and supply in order to develop a statistically sound basis 
for examination of local government forecasts of economic growth 
and residential development. The analysis seeks to discern how ade-
quately the region's projected housing supply, based on current land 
use and development policies, will accommodate the job creation nec-
essary to support anticipated economic growth. 
The current market for housing is very strong, stimulated by a 
healthy regional economy in the last half of the 1990s and into 2001; 
housing prices have risen sharply in the last few years, as has growth in 
population and jobs. Such rapid growth, however, has prompted calls 
in some communities for new or revised planning, zoning, and envi-
ronmental policy actions to further restrict residential development. 
A related question arises. To what extent will such policy actions im-
pede job creation and, therefore, the future economic growth and 
prosperity of the region? 
EXECUTNE SUMMARY 
• Over the last thirty years the Washington region has trans-
formed from one driven by federal employment to one driven 
by both federal employment and procurement, resulting in 
one of the most dynamic economies in the country. The pres-
ence of the federal government and the expanded purchasing 
of services and goods by the government from private firms 
have been at the foundation of the growth of the region's 
economy. Residents of the Greater Washington area enjoy 
the highest incomes in the country, the greatest increase in 
new jobs of any other region in the past six years, the lowest 
rate of poverty, and an abundance of educational, cultural, 
and recreational opportunities. All of these characteristics 
combine to encourage more companies and organizations to 
locate in the area. The healthy economy also encourages 
more people move to the region to take advantage of the job 
opportunities. 
APPENDIX 
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• In the last several years, the Washington region has enjoyed a 
healthy economy and housing market. The region had the 
largest growth in new jobs from 1996 to 2001 than any other 
metropolitan area in the country. The region's healthy econ-
omy and job growth are major contributing factors to the high 
incomes in the region. In fact, the Greater Washington re-
gion has the highest median household income of all major 
metropolitan areas. The growth has occurred throughout the 
region and, in the past few years, jobs and housing have not 
only located in the suburbs, but interest and development are 
also focusing in the core jurisdictions. While there is a cur-
rent slump in the economy, the central area of the region is 
doing very well. The office market in the District of Columbia 
is the healthiest in the country and there are several new hous-
ing projects completed and many more proposed or planned. 
• Since 1970, the region has grown from a population of 3.62 
million to 5.75 million as of the 2000 Census. In growing by 
over 2.1 million persons in that time, the region has added 
1.03 million households and 1.72 million jobs. In addition, 
the region has also seen significant demographic changes. In 
1970, the typical household had two or more children and the 
majority had only the male spouse in the workforce. Today 
there are fewer children in the household and the large ma-
jority of married-couple family households have both spouses 
going to work. 
• Both the numerical and demographic changes in the past 
form a basis for the examination of the long-term outlook for 
the demand and supply of housing for the next 25 years. For 
each new job added in the 1970-2000 period, the region ad-
ded 0.60 new households to supply the housing for the 
workforce; conversely, each new household supplied the 
workforce for 1.67 new jobs. That relationship has varied, par-
ticularly in recent times, as population per household and 
workers per household has shrunk. In the 1990s, for example, 
each new household supplied the workforce for only 1.4 new 
jobs. 
• In forecasting the next 25 years, this study used a ratio of 1.60 
new jobs per household. This is only slightly less than the 
long-term historical trend and approximately the same trend 
being assumed collectively by local governments in their Co-
operative Forecasting process. This ratio is surely a conserva-
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tive assumption. If future workforce were to be supplied at 
the relationship of the 1990s experience between housing and 
jobs, the supply deficit projected by this research would be 
much larger. The assumption of 1.6 as the factor results in a 
projection of housing deficit that represents the least dire 
picture. 
• By 2005, the Greater Washington region is forecast to grow by 
1,510,000 jobs and is expected to grow by 768,900 households, 
based on the Cooperative Forecasts developed by the local 
governments. This job growth is an increase of forty-four per-
cent over the year 2000, which is less than half the growth the 
region experienced in the last thirty years, when it more than 
doubled (+105%). On an annual basis for the study area, this 
forecast is 60,400 new jobs per year average growth, which is 
slightly less than the experience of 61,300 from 1980 to 2000. 
• As of 2000, the region already had a deficit of housing. 
Household growth-and housing units-did not keep pace with 
job growth in the 1990s, and in 2000 was short by 7,900 units. 
More significantly, the normal housing stock vacancy was 
drawn down significantly during the 1990s, which was a con-
tributing factor to the steep rise in housing values the last few 
years. Using the 1990 vacancy rate as a norm, the region had 
a vacancy deficit in 2000 of 35,300 units. Added to the de-
mand gap due to job growth for the period, the region started 
out in 2000 with a total housing unit deficit of 43,200 units. 
• Applying the historical ratio of 1.6 jobs per household, the 
demand for new households by 2025 to supply the work force 
for the job forecast is 944,000, or 174,900 more than local gov-
ernment expectations-meaning that there will be a shortfall 
in 2025 of approximately that many housing units. In other 
words, the local governments of the region are collectively ex-
pecting and allowing for 174,900 too few housing units. Ad-
ding this to the deficit starting out in 2000 means that in 2025 
the total housing deficit will be 218,200 units. 
• Looking at the results of this analysis by 5-year period from 
2000 to 2025 shows the deficits at each 5-year point: 
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• The deficit in housing will mean that the adopted plans for 
several jurisdictions will achieve buildout long before what is 
currently anticipated, expressed as the local government fore-
casts of households. Howard County, for one, says it will 
reach buildout in 2015. However, in 2025, Fairfax, Loudoun, 
and Prince William Counties, and probably Montgomery 
County, will all be approaching estimates of plan buildout ca-
pacity based on their own forecasts. Therefore, if the housing 
deficit in 2025 is 174,900 units, these counties will likely be 
reaching plan buildout long before 2025. 
• The converse of the housing supply view of this analysis is that, 
in 2025, if the local government expectations and policy con-
straints succeed and new household growth as developed by 
the local governments comes to pass, the region's potential 
economic growth will have been reduced by 288,400 jobs. Al-
ternatively, those jobs would be filled by workers commuting 
in from outside the study area-Le., from beyond Frederick, 
Howard, Anne Arundel Counties in Maryland and from be-
yond King George, Culpepper, Fauquier, Warren and Clarke 
Counties in Virginia-further exacerbating a very serious com-
muting and transportation problem already being exper-
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ienced today. Commuting from the outer areas into the 
central employment areas of the region has already increased 
significantly. In 1970, there were 64,200 workers commuting 
into the central employment area of D.C., Arlington, Alexan-
dria, Fairfax, Montgomery, and Prince George's Counties. By 
1990, that had increased to 300,000 and, by extrapolation, 
would be 450,000 today. 
• The ultimate effects of restricting housing supply could be 
many, and none of them positive. A deficit of supply, given 
economic demand, could mean: 
• Higher housing prices and increasingly inadequate supply 
of housing affordable for low and moderate-income 
households 
• More developments occurring further out in order to at-
tain some affordability, putting increased suburban growth 
and cost pressures on now-rural counties. 
• Longer, more congested, and odd-hour commutes. 
• All of these would eventually mean a stagnant or declining 
economy and quality of life. 
• Local economic factors explain approximately fifty percent of 
the change in the price of housing in the Washington region. 
Holding non-local factors constant-mortgage rates, con-
sumer confidence, etc.-income and job growth generate 
housing price increases that exceed the national average. 
These increasing prices could be thought of as the premium 
paid for living in an area having a growing economy. Project-
ing to 2025, using the statistical correlation between economic 
and job growth with housing prices, the median housing value 
in the region will rise to $415,000 by 2025 compared to 
$177,000 in 2000 (both in 1996 dollars). Relating this to pro-
jections of income over the forecast period shows that af-
fordability (measured by median housing value divided by 
median income) will decline significantly by 2025. The chart 
below shows the region in 2000 compared to the other top ten 
metro areas with the projected ratio for 2025 for Washington. 
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• This projected increase in housing prices does not include the ef-
fects of an inadequate supply of housing. which is projected to be 
218,100 units short. 
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